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A THRICE-TOLD TALE, OR FELIX THE CAT 
Michael Ariens* 
Few legal scholars would dispute the constitutional, historical, and po-
litical importance of the events of 1937, when the Supreme Court, faced with 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's plan to reorganize the federal judi-
ciary, ultimately approved a sweeping interpretation of governmental au-
thority to implement socioeconomic legislation. The course of events, al-
though frequently canvassed, has yielded conflicting interpretations of the 
actions and motivations of the Justices who took part in the fabled "switch 
in time that saved nine ." In this Article, Professor Ariens argues that Felix 
Frankfurter played a pivotal role in disseminating a particular history of the 
events of 1937. Reversing his own privately expressed position of dismay at 
the Court's actions in 1937, Frankfurter, in a memorial tribute to Justice 
Owen Roberts in 1955, revised the history of the events of 1937, a history 
that placed the Court above the fray of politics in its decisionmaking. Pro-
fessor Ariens argues that the events of 1954-1959, the era of Brown v. Board 
of Education, played an integral part in shaping Frankfurter's revised history 
of 1937 and led to its widespread acceptance . Professor Ariens draws, from 
the interrelationship of these two constitutional events, telling lessons about 
post-War legal thought and the evolution of constitutional history. 
"You could precisely quantify the influence of Shakespeare on T .S. 
Eliot." 
"But my thesis isn't about that," said Persse. "It's about the influ-
ence of T. S. Eliot on Shakespeare." 
"That sounds rather Irish, if I may say so," said Dempsey, with a 
loud guffaw. His little eyes looked anxiously around for support. 
DAVID LODGE, SMALL WORLDl 
I. 
Much of the future of American law depends on how the events of 
I 93 7 are interpreted. 
DONALD H . GJERDINGEN, THE POLITICS OF THE 
COASE THEOREM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO 
MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT2 
Influence runs against, as well as with, time. Our appreciation of 
the constitutional crisis of I 93 7 depends as much on the events oc-
* Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law. Thanks to Don Gjerdingen and Steve 
Smith for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft, and to Rich Friedman for his 
comments and suggestions on a later draft. Many thanks to my research assistant Connie Liem 
for her excellent help , and to Dean Barbara Bader Aldave for financially supporting this 
research. 
1 DAVID LODGE, SMALL WORLD 6o (paperback ed. 1986). 
2 Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Politics of the Coase Theorem and Its Relationship to Modern 
Legal Thought , 35 BUFF. L. REv. 871, 917 (1986). 
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curring after that crisis as on the events leading to it. The "lesson" 
learned from Presideht Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "Court-Packing 
Plan" and from the "switch in time that saved nine" depends on the 
particular instructional manual from which one reads. 
The manual I intend to present focuses on the importance of Felix 
Frankfurter. In discussing the historical understanding of the Justices 
of the Supreme Court, Professor John Henry Schlegel wrote, "there is 
the problem of Felix Frankfurter."3 Justice Frankfurter remains a 
problem if one wants to understand twentieth-century legal history. 
His influence as a law professor and intellectual activist, his influence 
as a member of the Court, and his influence directing the work of 
other constitutional scholars must be taken into account when assess-
ing constitutional histories . In this Article, I suggest that Justice Felix 
Frankfurter tried to coordinate history to protect the integrity of the 
Court as he saw it, and that he succeeded. 
The Court's power to invalidate state and federal legislative action 
has always been based on the assumption that the Court exercises 
judgment rather than will . 4 Although the legislative and executive 
branches were intended to be political branches and were allowed, 
within their constitutional power, to impose their will in law, the 
judiciary was to stand athwart the political process, to exercise judg-
ment in deciding cases, and to ensure the supremacy of the Consti-
tution . Politics was about power and required a willingness to com-
promise; as a result, politicians were to be subject to regular elections. 
Judging was about protecting the liberty of persons and institutions 
from the abuses of political power and required adherence to (consti-
tutional) principle; therefore , once appointed, federal judges were to 
remain in office "during good Behaviour. "5 These distinguishing char-
acteristics necessitated the claims of both judicial independence from 
politics and judicial nonintervention in politics. 
J John H . Schlegel, The Line Between H istory and Casenote, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 969, 
974 (1988). 
4 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. , 1961) 
("[The judiciary] may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment 
.... "); see also Court-Packing Plan , in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 203, 204 (Kermit L. Hall ed ., 1992) [hereinafter OXFORD HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT] ("[The Court-Packing Plan] reinforced the American people 's understanding 
that law and politics should be separated , and that although the Supreme Court was not wholly 
above politics , it must not be converted into a political institution."). 
s U.S. CONST. art. III , § r. Alexander Hamilton defended the life-tenure provision as 
fo llows: 
[A]s liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything 
to fear from its union with either of the other departments . .. and that as nothing can 
contribute so much to its firmness and independence as permanency in office , this quality 
may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and, 
in a great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public security. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 4, at 466 . 
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The Court's authority to interpret the Constitution was thus linked 
to the Court's separation from politics. For post-World War II con-
stitutional scholars, the most widely known event suggesting that the 
Court was engulfed in politics was the "switch" by Justice Owen 
Roberts during the spring of I 93 7, a switch that many believed was 
the result of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "court-packing" 
plan. 6 By severing the link between FDR's plan and Justice Roberts's 
actions in I93 7, Felix Frankfurter protected the Court's position as 
primary interpreter of the Constitution. Reestablishing the Court's 
authority was again crucial during the last half of the I950S, when 
the Court's legitimacy as an authoritative constitutional interpreter 
was at risk as a result of its Brown decisions. 7 Understanding the 
constitutional crisis of I 93 7 and its particular relevance to the chal-
lenge of Brown in the I950S requires another look at the machinations 
of Felix Frankfurter. In this manual, Frankfurter plays two roles-
one as Supreme Court Justice, and a second as guardian of the Court's 
virtue . 
For Felix Frankfurter, the Supreme Court was a temple, a sacred 
place. 8 It was sacred because the Court decided cases (and interpreted 
the Constitution) according to the rule of law. The covenant between 
the Court and "the people" required the Court to decide cases based 
on reason and judgment rather than on personal preference or will. 
As long as the Court upheld its part of this covenant, it remained a 
revered institution dutifully undertaking its arduous responsibilities. 
If, however, politics were to intrude into the Court, this intrusion 
would lead to the Court's "desecration." Politics could infect the Court 
from without or from within, but no matter what the source, the 
result would be the same. As both a devoted worshipper and one of 
its high priests, Justice Frankfurter tended the Court's garden of law 
from the wilderness of politics. From I954 to I959, Justice Frank-
furter 's challenge was particularly acute; the Court was saddled with 
the heavy burden of proving that its decisions in Brown were the 
result of an exercise of judgment rather than will, and Justice Frank-
furter 's version of the events of I93 7 helped to ease that burden. 
In I93 7, the Supreme Court faced a crisis involving its authority 
to interpret the Constitution. The crisis ended only after it appeared 
that the wall separating law from politics had crumbled. That reso-
lution caused Frankfurter to lash out privately at the intrusion of 
6 See infra pp. 627-28. 
7 See Brown v. Board of Educ. , 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that segregated public 
schooling violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause). On May 31 , 1955 , 
the Court announced the desegregation of segregated public schools "with all deliberate speed." 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
8 See infra p. 667 . 
1994] A THRICE-TOLD TALE 623 
politics into the Supreme Court. In a March 30, 1937, letter to FDR, 
Frankfurter wrote: "And now, with the shift by Roberts, even a blind 
man ought to see that the Court is in politics, and understand how 
the Constitution is 'judicially' construed. It is a deep object lesson -
a lurid demonstration - of the relation of men to the 'meaning' of 
the Constitution. "9 
Nearly a generation later, Frankfurter, by then a Justice of the 
Supreme Court, had a new tale to tell. In a memorial tribute to 
Justice Owen J. Roberts published in the December 1955 issue of the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 10 Justice Frankfurter suc-
cessfully sowed the seeds of a revisionist history of the "switch in time 
that saved nine. "11 Justice Frankfurter's revisionist history permitted 
defenders of the Supreme Court to claim that Justice Roberts had not 
altered his stance in 1937 as a result of FDR's court-packing plan. 12 
Frankfurter's new story presented Justice Roberts's abrupt shift in the 
spring of 193 7 as one based on constitutional principle, and certainly 
not on politics. Consequently, the American people, and their public 
officials, could continue to entrust the Court with the power of judicial 
review, because the Court's independent assessment of the constitu-
tionality of state and federal law was necessary to the proper func-
tioning of the American democratic experiment. 13 
9 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 30, 1937), in ROOSEVELT 
AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-45, at 392 (Max Freedman ed., 1967) 
[hereinafter ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER]. 
10 See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 311 (1955). 
11 Professor Philip Bobbitt and Roosevelt biographer Kenneth S. Davis credit this phrase to 
Harvard Law School Professor Thomas Reed Powell. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FATE 39 (1982); KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: INTO THE STORM 1937-40, at 81 (1993). Neither 
cites Powell's use of this phrase. At least three other variations exist. Joseph Alsop takes credit 
for the phrase "a switch in time saves nine." JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 
DAYS 135 (1938). Leonard Baker credits Abe Fortas with the quip "the switch in time that 
serves nine ." LEONARD BAKER, BACK To BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME 
COURT 174 (1967) (citing High Court Assailed at Labor Institute, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1937, 
at 19). Professor Gerald Gunther and The Oxford Dictionary of American Legal Quotations 
quote the phrase as "[t]he switch in time that saved the Nine." GERALD GUNTHER, CoNSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 457 (12th ed. 1991) [hereinafter GUNTHER, TWELFTH EDITION]; THE OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 393 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 1993). Neither 
identifies the author of the quip. 
12 On February s, 1937, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt announced a bill to reorganize 
the federal judiciary. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, The 342d Press Conference (Feb. s, 1937), 
in 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE CONSTITUTION 
PREVAILS 1937, at 35, 49-50 (1941) [hereinafter PuBLIC PAPERS: THE CONSTITUTION PREVAILS]. 
Roosevelt 's proposed legislation was attacked by its opponents as a "court-packing" plan. 
13 As Hamilton wrote in The Federalist: 
[T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the 
legislature in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to 
their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts . A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as , a fundamental 
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Justice Frankfurter's new story took hold among a generation of 
legal scholars deeply committed to the law/politics divide and came 
at a time when the threat to that divide was particularly acute. For 
those scholars, after the crisis of 193 7, "the problems for all of us 
became: How can we defend a judicial veto in areas where we thought 
it helpful in American life - civil liberties area, personal freedom, 
First Amendment - and at the same time condemn it in the areas 
where we considered it unhelpful?"14 These problems were made 
more acute by the Brown decisions, decisions in which a "legal jus-
tification [was needed] for what Uustice Frankfurter] agreed was a 
'congenial' political solution. "15 
I suggest the following can be learned from this Article: first, Felix 
Frankfurter had a major impact on the course of American law and 
understanding that impact is necessary in order to comprehend twen-
tieth-century legal history; second, Justice Frankfurter's revisionist 
history of Justice Roberts's actions in 193 7 was only incidentally a 
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any 
particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an 
irreconcilable variance between the two, . . . the Constitution ought to be preferred to 
the statute .... 
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 4, at 467. 
14 Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles" in the Law: Selections 
from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 854, 924 (1993) (quoting an 
interview of Herbert Wechsler sometime between 1978 and 1982 (citations omitted)). 
IS Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education , 
91 COLUM. 1. REV. 1867, 1919 (1991). 
Part of the fissure between legal progressives in the late 1950s involved the justification of 
Brown. See infra pp. 669-74. Initially, most legal scholars defended the Court's decision in 
Brown as a proper "legal" interpretation of the Constitution. After the criticisms of Brown by 
Judge Learned Hand and, more importantly, Professor Herbert Wechsler in their successive 
Holmes lectures, however, scholars have since grounded defenses of Brown on either the Court's 
or the Constitution's "moral" authority rather than its "legal" authority. See MICHAEL J . 
GERHARDT & THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 6 (1993) (stating that Brown 
represents "an activist decision striking down legislative action, with what many believed was 
questionable justification in conventional legal terms but with social and moral import that 
found wide approval in the liberal community (and, of course, not only there)"); ALPHEUS T. 
MASON, THE SUPREME COURT: PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 178 (1962) ("(The Supreme Court's] 
decisions, based on reason and authority, have a moral force far exceeding that of the purse or 
sword."); see also Tushnet & Lezin, supra, at 1919 (asserting that Justice Frankfurter's difficulty 
with Brown was that, "if Congress did not 'manifest' an intent to 'outlaw segregation,' where 
could the Court find its authority to hold segregation unconstitutional?"). 
On Wechsler's lecture, one commentator has stated: 
I have always found it more than slightly repellent that [Wechsler's lecture], which 
depends for its entire intellectual enterprise on the proposition that the pursuit of human 
equality is not a neutral principle of law, and hence is an insufficient basis for ordering 
the end of de jure racial segregation of schools, is the second most frequently cited law 
review article of all time. 
Eben Moglen, The Transformation of Morton Horwitz , 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1042, 1056 n.36 
(1993) (reviewing MORTON }. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992)) . 
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defense of Justice Roberts - this history was primarily an effort to 
protect the Court's authority to interpret the Constitution at a time 
when Brown threatened to compromise that authority; and third, the 
crisis of 1937 was a turning point in our legal history, but possibly 
for reasons other than those suggested by Professors Ackerman 16 and 
Gjerdingen. 17 The constitutional crisis of 193 7 remains important less 
because of what really happened and more because the subsequent 
explanations and analyses of the crisis tell us much about our desire 
to shape the past for use in the present. These differing stories of the 
Supreme Court in 1937 also tell us something about the attractions 
and dangers of our fascination with the rule of law. 
After a brief summary of the events leading up to and culminating 
in the constitutional crisis of 193 7, I examine the reactions of scholars 
to those events. The initial history of the crisis was that Justice 
Roberts "switched" in response to FDR's court-packing plan. This 
belief was predominant until the publication in early 1956 of Justice 
Frankfurter's revisionist history of Roberts's actions. This revisionist 
history, which claimed that Justice Roberts' votes were based on 
principle, not politics, was accepted by most legal scholars. A crucial 
reason that Justice Frankfurter presented his revisionist history, and 
that most legal scholars accepted it, was the need to preserve the role 
of the Court as a principled decisionmaker, a need that was particu-
larly acute because of Brown, which raised the issue of the Court's 
authority in a manner reminiscent of the crisis of a generation before. 
II. 
The story of the 1937 Court fight is a twice-told tale. 
WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT18 
A. 
Although in 1934 and early 1935 the Supreme Court alternately 
pleased both friend and foe of the New Deal, 19 the Court set its course 
!6 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 40, 47-50, 105-30 (I99I) 
(hereinafter ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE]. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECON-
STRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 6-22 (I984) (discussing the realist legacy of the New Deal). Pro-
fessor Ackerman suggests that the events of I 93 7 encompass one of three instances of consti-
tutional politics in America, a revolution that "ends in the constitutional triumph of the activist 
welfare state." ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra, at 40. 
11 See Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Future of Legal Scholarship and the Search for a Modern 
Theory of Law, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 38I , 44I-45, 460-73 (I986); Donald H. Gjerdingen, The 
Future of Our Past: The Legal Mind and the Legacy of Classical Common-Law Thought, 68 
IND. L.J. 743, 764- 68 (I993); Gjerdingen, supra note 2, at 893-904, 9I7-33· Professor Gjer-
dingen believes that "the events of I 93 7 represent a change from an unqualified transactional 
justice system to a distributive justice system." ld. at 875. 
l8 WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 57 (I962). 
l9 Compare Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 302, 3I6 (I93S) (upholding the 
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in firm opposition to the New Deal with a series of decisions in May 
1935. In Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co ., 20 the 
Court, in an opinion by Justice Roberts, held unconstitutional the 
Railroad Retirement Act, which required railroads to create pension 
plans for their employees. 21 Three weeks later, on May 27, 1935, a 
day New Dealers would remember as "Black Monday," the Supreme 
Court unanimously held unconstitutional two Acts of Congress and a 
presidential executive order. In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. 
Radford22 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brandeis, struck down 
the Frazier-Lemke Farm-Mortgage Act of 1934, concluding that the 
Act deprived mortgagees of their property without due process of 
law. 23 The Court next announced its decision in Humphrey's Executor 
v. United States. 24 In Humphrey's Executor, the Court held uncon-
stitutional FDR's decision to fire William Humphrey as a commis-
sioner of the Federal Trade Commission.25 Finally, in A.L.A. Schech-
ter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 26 the "Sick Chicken" case, the 
Court concluded that the National Industrial Recovery Act violated 
the Commerce Clause, because the Act was an attempt by Congress 
to regulate intrastate commerce. 27 The Court then recessed for the 
summer. President Roosevelt responded initially by attacking the 
Court, 28 but shortly thereafter he stopped speaking publicly about the 
Court's decisions. 
The Supreme Court's 1935 Term brought more confrontation. 
Early in the Term, the Court held unconstitutional the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 as beyond Congress's spending power. 29 May, 
repudiation by the administration of the contractual duty to repay debts in gold) with Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430-33 (1935) (declaring unconstitutional the "hot oil" 
provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933). The Court also upheld several state 
statutes that regulated economic matters. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 538-
39 (1934) (allowing New York to fix the price of milk); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 
290 U.S. 398, 447-48 (1934) (rejecting a Contracts Clause challenge to a Minnesota law that 
temporarily halted mortgage foreclosures). 
20 295 u.s. 330 (I935). 
21 See id. at 374· 
22 295 U.S. 555 (I935). 
23 See id. at 6oi-02 . 
24 295 U.S. 6o2 (I935). 
25 See id. at 632. 
26 295 U.S. 495 (I935). 
21 See id . at 550-51. 
28 This was FDR's famous "horse-and-buggy" press conference of May 3I, I935· See Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt, The 209th Press Conference (May 31, I935), in 4 THE PuBLIC PAPERS AND 
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE COURT DISAPPROVES I935, at 22 I (1938) (here-
inafter PuBLIC PAPERS: THE COURT DISAPPROVES] ("We have been relegated to the horse-and-
buggy definition of interstate commerce."). 
29 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I, 77-78 (I936). Shortly thereafter, however, in 
Ash wander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (I936), the Court upheld the constitution-
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however, was once again the cruelest month for FDR. In Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co., 30 five members of the Court held unconstitutional 
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, which set minimum 
prices for the sale of coal, gave employees a right to bargain collec-
tively, and created a structure to implement area-wide wage and hour 
terms. 31 One week later, the Court, in Morehead v. New York ex rel. 
Tipaldo, 32 held unconstitutional New York's minimum wage statute, 
relying in part on precedent. 33 Joining the "Four Horsemen"34 (Jus-
tices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter) in the ma-
jority was Justice Roberts. Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Bran-
deis, Stone, and Cardozo dissented. 35 Morehead involved a state law, 
not New Deal legislation. However, several years earlier, FDR had 
recommended that a number of governors consider and adopt a min-
imum wage law based on the New York statute.36 The Court's 
Morehead decision thus constitutionally blocked any such action. 
B . 
A month after the opening of the Court's 1936 Term, Roosevelt 
was reelected, winning 523 electoral votes to Alf Landon's 8, and 
receiving over sixty percent of the popular vote. 37 On February 5, 
1937, shortly after reinauguration , Roosevelt announced his proposed 
ality of the Tennessee Valley Authority, see id. at 330. Justice Roberts joined Justice Brandeis's 
concurring opinion. See id . at 341 (Brandeis, J. , concurring) . 
30 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
3l See id. at 31 5- 17. In a sepa rate opinion, Chief Justice Hughes concurred in holding the 
labor provisions unconstitutional and dissented with respect to the minimum price provisions. 
See id. at 317 (separate opinion of Hughes, C.J. ). Justice Cardozo's dissent was joined by 
Justices Brandeis and Stone. See id. at 324 (Cardozo, J. dissenting in Nos. 636, 649 and 650, 
and concurring in the result in No. 65 1). 
32 298 u.s. 587 (1936). 
33 See id . at 6q-18. T he Court relied on Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S . 525 (1923), 
which struck down the District of Columbia's minimum wage law as an unconstitutional 
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see id. at 561-62. 
34 See Four H orsemen, in OXFORD HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 4, at 309 
(noting, in reference to the four Justices consistently opposed to New Deal legislation , that they 
"evoked the legendary Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse"). 
35 See Morehead , 298 U.S. at 6r8 (Hughes, C.J ., dissenting); id . at 63 1 (Stone, J. , dissenting). 
36 See Telegram from Franklin D. Roosevelt to 13 State Governors (Apr. 12, 1933), in 2 
T HE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE YEAR OF CRISIS 
I933, at 133 (1938) (hereinafter PUBLIC PAPERS: THE YEAR OF CRISIS]. The state of New York 
undertook the effort to create minimum wage legislation that would withstand a constitutional 
attack during FDR's term as governor, and the legislation passed in March 1933 . See JOSEPH 
P. LASH, DEALERS AND DREAMERS 47- 53 (1988). It was written as a model minimum wage 
statute for the National Consumers League by Benjamin Cohen, with the editorial guidance of 
then-Professor Frankfurter. See id. at 52. 
37 Roosevelt garnered 27,752,869 votes to Landon's 16,674,665 votes. All other candidates 
received a total of 1,200,982 votes. S ee 2 THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE: AN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 384 (Carl N. Degler ed . , 4th ed. 1979). 
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legislation to reorganize the federal judiciary. 38 Part of this plan was 
a proposal to nominate to any federal court one additional judge for 
each sitting judge over the age of seventy. The President's proposal, 
ostensibly, was to reduce the overloaded docket of the Supreme 
Court. 39 Six members of the Supreme Court were over seventy, and 
not surprisingly, the plan gave the President the opportunity to nom-
inate a maximum of six additional Justices to the Supreme Court. 
The Senate finally voted down FDR's amended legislation on July 
22, 1937. 40 In the interim, President Roosevelt signed a bill guaran-
teeing retired Justices a pension that could not be decreased; Senator 
Burton Wheeler, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, man-
aged to arrange the signing of a letter by Chief Justice Hughes, to 
which Justices Brandeis and Van Devanter assented, declaring that 
the Court was up to date in its work; Justice Van Devanter resigned 
on May 18, 1937; on the same day, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
voted 10-8 to report to the Senate that such a bill should "never again 
be presented to the free representatives of the free people of Amer-
ica;"41 Vice-President John Nance Garner left Washington for Texas 
while Congress was in session for the first time in over thirty years 
of governmental service; and in June, Joe Robinson of Arkansas -
Senate majority leader, chief congressional proponent of FDR's plan, 
and heir apparent to Van Devanter's vacated seat - died of a heart 
attack during the fight for passage of an amended court reorganization 
plan. 42 
During this period, two other events stood out. The events were 
a pair of decisions by the Supreme Court, both decided by a vote of 
5-4. On March 29, 1937, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 43 the 
Court held constitutional the state of Washington's minimum wage 
act. 44 Two weeks later, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 4s 
the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act. 46 
38 See Roosevelt, supra note I2, at 35, 45-50. The court reorganization plan was developed 
by Attorney General Homer Cummings, who met secretly with FDR. The origins of FDR's 
court reorganization plan have been masterfully detailed in William E. Leuchtenburg, The 
Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, I966 SuP. CT. REV. 347· 
39 See Roosevelt, supra note 12, at 35-44. 
40 See William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR's Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, A Second 
Death , 1985 DUKE L.J. 673 , 687-89. 
41 ld. at 675 (quoting SENATE COMM. ON THE }UDICIARY, REORGANIZATION OF THE FED-
ERAL JuDICIARY, S. REP. No. 7II, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. I, 23 (1937)). 
42 See id. at 674, 685. 
43 300 u.s. 379 (1937). 
44 See id. at 399-400. 
45 30I U.S. I (I937). 
46 See id. at 30. A third event, another decision by the Court, is also noteworthy. On May 
24, 1937, the Court- again by a vote of 5-4, again with Justice Roberts silently in the majority 
- upheld the Social Security Act in the Social Security Cases. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 
U.S. 6I9, 640-45 (1937); Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 583, 585 (I937l-
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C. 
The opm10n in West Coast Hotel was read from the bench by 
Chief Justice Hughes. Only ten months before, a majority of the 
Court had held in More head that state minimum wage acts violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 Because the 
composition of the Court remained the same, these conflicting deci-
sions were possible only because Justice Roberts concluded that Wash-
ington's minimum wage law, unlike New York's, was constitutional. 
Two weeks later, the Court determined in Jones & Laughlin Steel 
that Congress acted pursuant to its constitutionally granted power to 
regulate commerce among the several states by regulating the terms 
and conditions of employment of manufacturing employees . 48 This 
decision seemed implicitly to overrule Carter v . Carter Coal Co. ,49 
which was decided less than one year earlier. The Court, again per 
Chief Justice Hughes, largely ignored Carter, neither distinguishing 
nor overruling its interpretation of the Commerce Clause. Justice 
Roberts was again the only member of the Court to join fully with 
the majority in both Carter and Jones & Laughlin Steel. In neither 
West Coast Hotel nor Jones & Laughlin Steel did Justice Roberts 
write an opinion explaining the abrupt shift in his voting posture . 
III. 
And now, with the shift by Roberts , even a blind man ought to see 
that the Court is in politics, and understand how the Constitution is 
"judicially" construed. It is a deep object lesson - a lurid demon-
stration - of the relation of men to the "meaning" of the Constitution. 
FELIX FRANKFURTER TO FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT , 
MARCH 30 , 1937 50 
Frankfurter's private reaction (publicly he remained silent, as he 
had about FDR's plan) to the Court's decisions was immediate and 
unsparing. In addition to his letter to FDR written the day after West 
Coast Hotel was decided, Frankfurter wrote to Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone: "Roberts' somersault [is] incapable of being attributed to a 
single factor relevant to the professed judicial process. Everything 
The decisions in the S ocial S ecurity Cases, broadly interpreting Congress's general welfare 
power, were clearly a departure from the 1936 decision of United S tates v. Butler. See United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (opinion of Roberts, ]. ) (holding unconstitutional a federal 
statute subsidizing farmers to reduce their acreage and crops with funds exacted through a tax 
on processors of agricultural commodities). 
4i See supra p. 627 . 
48 See J ones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 30-3 1. 
49 298 u.s. 238 (1936) . 
so Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Franklin D. Roosevelt , supra note 9, at 392 . 
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that he now subscribes to he rejected not only on June first last, but 
as late as October twelfth when New York's petition for a rehearing 
was denied . . .. "51 Two days later, replying to Justice Brandeis's 
letter, which speculated that "[o]verruling Adkins' Case must give you 
some satisfaction, "52 Frankfurter responded, "[i]t is characteristically 
kind of you to think of the aspects of the Washington minimum wage 
case that would give me some satisfaction, but, unhappily, it is one 
of life's bitter-sweets and the bitter far outweighs the sweet. "53 A day 
after Jones & Laughlin Steel was decided, Frankfurter wrote to 
Charles Wyzanski that "[t]o me it is all painful beyond words, the 
poignant grief of one whose life has been dedicated to faith in the 
disinterestedness of a tribunal and its freedom from responsiveness to 
the most obvious immediacies of politics "54 
A . 
There were two immediate chronicles of the constitutional cns1s 
of 1937 : The r68 Days by Joseph Alsop and Turner Catledge, 55 and 
The Supreme Court Crisis by Merlo Pusey. 56 Alsop and Catledge's 
book, published in 1938, is notable for its sympathy toward Roose-
velt's court-reorganization legislation. The moral of their book is that, 
although the proposed legislation may have been defeated, "A Switch 
in Time Saves Nine. "57 For Alsop and Catledge, the minimum wage 
and Jones & Laughlin Steel decisions of the Supreme Court resulted 
less from the President's court-packing plan than from the Court's 
bending to the political will of a newly and resoundingly reelected 
President. 5s 
Pusey's work, on the other hand, which was supported by the 
American Bar Association and distributed to thousands of lawyers , is 
a bill of complaints against President Roosevelt. Pusey argues that 
an independent judiciary is the only institution that can protect the 
United States from a "dictatorial regime, "59 and that the court-packing 
5 I Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone (Mar. 30, 1937), in LIVA BAKER, FELIX 
FRANKFURTER 189-90 (1969) . 
52 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 29, 1937), in "HALF BROTHER, 
HALF SoN": THE LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS TO FELIX FRANKFURTER 594 (Melvin I. 
Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1991) (hereinafter HALF BROTHER, HALF SoN]. 
53 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Louis D. Brandeis, (Mar. 31, 1937), in HALF BROTHER, 
HALF SoN, supra note 52 , at 594 n. r. 
54 MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 272 
(1982) (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Wyzanski (Apr. 13, I937)). 
55 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note I I. 
56 MERLO J. PUSEY, THE SUPREME COURT CRISIS (I937). 
5l ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note II, at I35 · 
ss S ee id. at 2o-2I , I35-40. 
59 PusEY, supra note 56, at 48. 
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plan was an attack on the Court's independence. 6o Because his work 
was published as an "instant history" in June 1937, however, Pusey 
was unable to construct a legal defense of the Supreme Court's West 
Coast Hotel and Jones and Laughlin Steel decisions. Instead, Pusey 
was left parroting the reasoning of Chief Justice Hughes's opinions. 6l 
Pusey concluded, with respect to the decision in West Coast Hotel, 
"[i]t is difficult to believe that their decision would have been different 
if the President had not asked power to pack the Court. "62 Pusey 
apparently was at a loss to explain the votes of Justice Roberts and 
Chief Justice Hughes in favor of the National Labor Relations Act. 63 
"Were [Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts] intimidated by the 
Administration's assault upon the Court? Did they adjust their con-
victions in the hope of saving the Court from the ignominy of being 
packed? These questions doubtless will never be answered. "64 One 
answer, however, was that to ask these questions reinforced the ne-
cessity of an independent judiciary. Pusey was unwilling to accept 
the conclusion that politics affected the Court's decisions, but he was 
nevertheless unable to provide constitutionally based reasons for the 
Court's change of mind. 
B . 
Notwithstanding Pusey's opinions, for more than a decade and a 
half, most studies of the constitutional crisis of 193 7 concluded that 
politics, in the form of FDR's reelection and his Court reorganization 
plan, caused the Court to alter its voting pattern. The historians 
Charles and Mary Beard ironically noted that the Court's decisions in 
West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin Steel "[t]o mere laymen ... 
looked like a reversal of opinion. "65 Before taking a seat on the 
Supreme Court, Robert H. Jackson authored The Struggle for Judicial 
60 See id. at 44-46. 
6! Pusey would later become Hughes's biographer. See MERLO]. PuSEY, CHARLES EvANS 
HUGHES (2 vols . 1951). 
62 PusEY, supra note 56, at 51. Pusey based this conclusion solely on Hughes's statement 
that, unlike counsel for Elsie Parrish in West Coast Hotel, counsel for New York in Morehead 
asked only that the Court distinguish Morehead from Adkins rather than reconsider Adkins. 
See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 389 (1937); PusEY, supra note 56 , at 49· This 
was disingenuous on Chief Justice Hughes's part, because counsel for New York in Morehead 
had asked for reconsideration of Adkins in its petition for certiorari, and counsel for Parrish 
had largely urged the Court to distinguish rather than overrule both Adkins and Morehead . 
See Appellee's Brief on the Law at 3-4, West Coast Hotel (No. 293), reprinted in 33 LANDMARK 
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 9I (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds. , 1975) (hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENTS]. 
63 See PuSEY, .upra note 56, at 57-53· 
64 /d . at 53· 
65 I CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, AMERICA IN MIDPASSAGE 359 (1939). 
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Supremacy: A Study of a Crisis in American Power Politics,66 an 
examination of the crisis of 193 7. He observed that "[the Justices of 
the Supreme Court] confessed legal error and saved themselves from 
political humiliation. They subdued the rebellion against their con-
stitutional dogma by joining it. "67 Max Lerner was slightly more 
equivocal. He explained in 1942 that "[t]here are some who maintain 
that Justices Hughes and Roberts had already made up their minds 
to retreat before the President announced his Court plan. We shall 
never know for certain what went on between the Justices during the 
Saturday sessions at which they discussed their coming decisions. "68 
In the same year, Professor Benjamin F. Wright assayed the con-
clusion that the court-packing plan caused the "switch in time. "69 The 
great political scientist Edward S. Corwin also concluded that politics 
rather than law had influenced the Court's West Coast Hotel and 
Jones & Laughlin Steel decisions.7° However, like Alsop and Ca-
tledge, Corwin also believed that Roosevelt's reelection was more 
responsible for the change of heart by Justices Hughes and Roberts 
than Roosevelt's Court reorganization plan. 71 Carl Swisher con-
cluded, "the feeling of the public, and probably of the bar as well, 
was that Justice Roberts had deemed it expedient to change his po-
sition because of the movement to reorganize the Court. "72 Robert 
Stern wrote in the Harvard Law Review that the Court's sudden 
reversal was not attributable "to anything inherent in the cases them-
selves,"73 and argued that the consensus was that Justice Roberts and 
Chief Justice Hughes altered their votes to save the "independent" 
judiciary from legislative restructuring. 74 
In 1948, C. Herman Pritchett, amazed by the Court's West Coast 
Hotel decision, declared that "the Court itself began to prove the truth 
of Mr. Dooley's conclusion that that estimable body generally, if be-
66 See ROB ERT H. }ACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR }UDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A 
CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS at xviii (1941). Jackson was FDR's Attorney General in 
1940 and 1941 before his appointment to the Supreme Court, and in 1937, as Solicitor General, 
he ardently supported FDR's court-packing plan. 
67 /d . at vi. 
68 Max Lerner, The Great Constitutional War, 18 VA. Q. REv. 530, 540 (1942). 
69 See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 202 & 
n.J (1942). 
70 See EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 73 (1941). 
71 See id. 
72 CARL B . SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 946 (1943); see also CARL 
B. SWISHER, THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 225-27 (1946) 
(describing the assessment of the Court's "switch in time" as a reaction to FDR's court-reorga-
nization plan). 
73 Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-46, 59 HARV. 
L. REv. 645, 681 (1946). 
74 See id. at 682. 
1994] A THRICE-TOLD TALE 
latedly, 'follows th' illiction returns. "'75 Four years later, the consti-
tutional historian and judicial biographer Alpheus T. Mason also 
concluded that politics had led to the reversal. 76 In 1953, Harvard-
educated Australian lawyer and legal scholar Edward McWhinney 
wrote that Justice Roberts had "switch[ed]" in 1937. 77 Yet even as 
the political explanation of the Court's actions in 1937 became the 
standardized version of events, Felix Frankfurter privately laid the 
groundwork for a wholly different account of those events, 78 an ac-
count more in keeping with the post-World War II legal academy's 
faith in the principled, disinterested judge. 
Against the predominant view, Pusey largely maintained a lonely 
vigil. 79 As the hand-picked80 biographer of Chief Justice Hughes, he 
75 C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND 
VALUES, 1937-1947, at 8--<) (I948) . 
76 See Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR's Court Plan, 6I YALE L.J. 79I, 
8I6 (I952); see also ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 627 (I946) (arguing 
that concern over proposals for reform of the federal judiciary prompted the Court to rule in 
favor of the administration in its I93 7 decisions). 
77 Edward McWhinney, Judicial Concurrences and Dissents: A Comparative View of Opin-
ion-Writing in Final Appellate Tribunals , 3I CANADIAN B. REv. 595, 6I3 (I953) . 
78 After McWhinney's article was published, Justice Frankfurter wrote to Professor Paul 
Freund of the Harvard Law School, asking "Am I wrong in having the impression that Edward 
McWhinney is something of a protege of yours?" Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Paul 
A. Freund, Professor, Harvard Law School (Oct. I8, I953), microformed on Felix Frankfurter 
Papers, Harvard Law School Library, at Part III, Reel IS (Univ. Publications of Am., Inc.) 
[hereinafter Harvard Frankfurter Papers]; Felix Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress, at 
Container 56 (Library of Congress Manuscript Div.) [hereinafter Library of Congress Frankfurter 
Papers]. In this letter, as in the Roberts memorandum, Frankfurter only discusses the "switch" 
regarding the minimum wage cases. Frankfurter then first privately expressed to Freund part 
of the claim that he would make publicly less than three years later: "The fact is that Roberts 
did not switch. He was prepared in Tipaldo to make a majority overruling Adkins. He was 
not prepared to distinguish Adkins. Because there was no majority for overruling Adkins he 
was in the majority in the Morehead case on the basis of which Morehead was decided." /d . 
at 1. Frankfurter then quoted Hughes' remark in West Coast Hotel that the issue in the 
Morehead case was whether to distinguish rather than overrule Adkins. See id. 
For a discussion of Freund's particular influence as a constitutional scholar, see pp. 659-62 
below. 
79 Pusey was joined in part only by Samuel Hendel and Charles Curtis. Hendel's book was 
published shortly before Pusey's in I9SI; Curtis's book was published in I947· See CHARLES 
P. CURTIS, JR., LIONS UNDER THE THRONE I59, I 74 (I947) (concluding that Justice Roberts 
"quite simply reverted to his former attitude in the N ebbia case three years before," but also 
concluding that some "shift" in Justice Roberts's positions took place in the minimum wage, 
Jones & Laughlin Steel , and Social Security Cases); SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS 
HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT 252-53 , 264-65 (195 1) (conceding that in West Coast Hotel 
Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts switched in part to defeat the court-packing plan, but 
arguing that Hughes's decision in Jones & Laughlin Steel was not a shift in position). 
80 Alpheus T. Mason was critical of Pusey's closeness to his biographical subject. See 
Alpheus T. Mason, Charles Evans Hughes: An Appeal to the Bar of History, 6 VAND. L. REv. 
I , I8-19 (I952) ("Mr. Hughes repudiated autobiography as smacking of 'apologia'; he distrusted 
independent research as running the risk of 'misrepresentation. ' Conscious of both these pitfalls, 
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argued that the Court had not switched in response to Roosevelt's 
plan. Regarding West Coast Hotel, Pusey quoted Hughes's Biograph-
ical Notes: "The President's proposal had not the slightest effect on 
our decision . "81 The questions Pusey found unanswerable in 193 7 
were answered in 1951. To deflect the charge that Justice Roberts 
"switched" his vote in the Jones & Laughlin Steel case, Pusey again 
quoted the Biographical Notes: "[A]s to Justice Roberts , I feel that I 
am able to say with definiteness that his view in favor of [the Jones 
& Laughlin Steel decision] would have been the same if the President's 
bill had never been proposed. The Court acted with complete inde-
pendence. "82 Because there was nothing other than Chief Justice 
Hughes's bald assertions83 to support the claim that the Court had 
not reacted to Roosevelt's plan, Pusey was alone in his vigil. 
This changed with the publication of Justice Felix Frankfurter's 
tribute to the late Justice Owen Roberts. 
IV. 
Frankfurter when the Diaries resume in 1943 (the Diary for 1937 has 
not been recovered) . . . 
}OSEPH P. LASH , FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER84 
he chose his biographer and worked closely with him over a period of several years."). When 
Mason published his biography of Harlan Fiske Stone, Pusey criticized Mason's lack of "objec-
tivity" in assessing the Hughes Court. See Merlo J . Pusey, A Great Man of the Law Portrayed: 
In a New Life of Chief Justice Stone a Chapter of American History Unrolls, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. II, 1956, § 7, at I (reviewing ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF 
THE LAW (1956)). 
8 I 2 PusEY, supra note 61 , at 757 (quoting Charles E . Hughes, Biographical Notes, ch. 
XXIII, at 31); THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 312 (David J. 
Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973) [hereinafter AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF HUGHES]. 
Chief Justice Hughes's Biographical Notes were published in 1973. See AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 
NOTES OF HUGHES, supra. 
8l AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF HUGHES, supra note 81 , at 313; 2 PuSEY, supra note 61, 
at 768 (quoting Charles E . Hughes, Biographical Notes, ch. XXIII, at 33). 
83 In a 1983 article, Pusey wrote that he had "confidential[ly]" interviewed Justice Roberts 
on May 31, 1946, at which time Justice Roberts convinced him that "his chief objective at that 
time had been to avoid making a decision on the vital issue of state minimum-wage legislation 
against the background of New York's disingenuous arguments." Merlo J . Pusey, Justice 
Roberts' 1937 Turnaround , 1983 Y.B. SuP. CT. HIST. Soc'y 102 , 106. Probably because the 
interview was confidential, Pusey did not cite this interview in his Hughes biography, but it 
may be considered additional, albeit biased, evidence for his conclusions. Pusey apparently did 
not ask Roberts to explain his votes in Jones & Laughlin Steel and the Social Security Cases. 
In the same article, Pusey also noted that Justice Roberts's "initial , semifacetious reply" to 
Pusey's question about a shift was: "Who knows what causes a judge to decide as he does? 
Maybe the breakfast he had has something to do with it." /d . 
84 JOSEPH P. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER I4I (1975). 
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In the December r95585 issue of the University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, Justice Frankfurter wrote a seven-page tribute to his 
former colleague, Justice Roberts. 86 Frankfurter's tribute had two 
purposes: first, to honor a former colleague, and second, to tell "[t]he 
truth about the so-called 'switch' of Roberts in connection with the 
Minimum Wage cases . . . . "87 Frankfurter accomplished his first 
purpose in little more than two pages; the remainder of the tribute 
consisted of his attempt to resolve the second issue. 
A. 
"It is one of the most ludicrous illustrations of the power of lazy 
repetition of uncritical talk that a judge with the character of Roberts 
should have attributed to him a change of judicial views out of 
deference to political considerations," began Frankfurter's defense. 88 
Frankfurter took special offense when prominent politicians and ac-
ademic scholars repeatedly claimed that Justice Roberts's votes 
changed as a result of Roosevelt's Court reorganization plan. This 
charge was false, and Frankfurter was going to refute it with "indis-
putable facts. "89 What were these indisputable facts? 
Frankfurter made three arguments to refute this charge. First, 
timing was everything. To understand Justice Roberts's votes, a crit-
85 The correspondence between Justice Frankfurter and the editors of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review indicates that the issue was actually published in late January or 
early February of 1956. See Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Container 
r8r. 
86 See Frankfurter, supra note ro . Roberts, a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, was a prominent lawyer in Philadelphia. See Erwin R. Griswold, Owen J. Roberts 
as a Judge, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 332, 332-33 (1955). He gained national attention for his work 
as special counsel investigating the Teapot Dome scandal. See id. In 1930, President Hoover 
appointed him to the Court. After resigning from the Court .at age seventy in 1945 , Roberts 
returned to private practice and a life as a gentleman farmer. He became Dean of the University 
of Pennsylvania Law School in 1948. See id. at 349· The sole published biography of Roberts 
is CHARLES A. LEONARD, A SEARCH FOR A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY (1971 ). 
Justice Roberts died on May 17 , 1955 , a year to the day after Brown was decided, and two 
weeks before the remedy in Brown was handed down. In a 1944 letter, Roberts made Frank-
furter his "judicial executor. " See Letter from Justice Owen J. Roberts to Justice Felix Frank-
furter (Oct. r2, 1944), microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78 , at Part III, 
Reel 3· Roberts's purpose in making Frankfurter his judicial executor was apparently to halt 
any "joint expression" from the Court and any "memorial ceremony." It does not appear to 
have been Frankfurter's "duty" to protect Roberts's reputation as a jurist after Roberts's death , 
and there is no mention in this letter of any explanation by Roberts of his actions in r 93 7. 
87 Frankfurter, supra note ro, at 314. 
88 /d . at 313. In the next sentence, Frankfurter noted an unnamed Senator's allusion to "the 
famous switch of Mr. Justice Roberts ." /d . Frankfurter was referring to Senator Paul Douglas, 
whose statement appeared in the April 13 , 1955 issue of the Congressional Record. See Clipping 
of April 13, 1955 Congressional Record (84th Cong., rst Sess. , at 363), microformed on Harvard 
Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 3· 
89 Frankfurter, supra note ro, at 313. 
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ical investigator needed to look at the interstices of the United States 
Reports. On November 23, 1936, two and one-half months before 
Roosevelt's Court plan was publicly announced, an evenly divided 
Supreme Court affirmed a New York Court of Appeals decision that 
had upheld the constitutionality of the New York Unemployment 
Insurance Law. 90 Because Justice Stone was ill and thus absent from 
the bench at that time, the fourth vote for to sustain the act must 
have come from Justice Roberts. 9l Because "[t]he constitutional out-
look represented by [that case] would reflect the attitude of a Justice 
towards the issues involved in the Adkins case, "92 Justice Roberts's 
vote on this date foreshadowed his vote in West Coast Hotel v. Par-
rish. Looking only at the United States Reports, therefore, it was 
apparent to any scholar of the Court that Justice Roberts's decision 
in West Coast Hotel was not influenced by Roosevelt's court-re-
organization legislation. 93 
90 See W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 299 U.S. 515, 515 (1936) (per curiam). 
91 See Frankfurter, supra note ro, at 3 r6. 
92 Id . 
93 The timing argument was unavailable with respect to Jones & Laughlin Steel and the 
Social Security Cases, because the votes in those cases took place after FDR's announcement 
of his Court reorganization plan. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. r (1937), 
was argued on February ro-rr, 1937; the Social Security Cases, Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. 
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 549 (1937); and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 6r9 (1937), were argued on 
April 8---9 and May 5 of that year. 
A similar timing argument regarding West Coast Hotel was made by then-Dean of Harvard 
Law School, Erwin Griswold, in his tribute to Roberts in the same issue of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law R eview. See Griswold, supra note 86, at 341-42. Dean Griswold wrote: 
The story is written quite clearly in the public record, but there has been much misun-
derstanding about it, and it is widely said that Roberts, frightened by the President's 
Court-packing plan, flopped over from a vote against minimum wage legislation in 1936 
to one in favor of such statutes in 1937. No one could say this with any understanding 
of Roberts. 
Id . at 340. 
Griswold's tribute had its own effect. In a 1991 review of Griswold's memoirs , the estimable 
federal courts scholar Charles Alan Wright wrote: 
The article [Griswold's tribute to Roberts) is completely convincing that neither the Court-
packing plan nor the outcome of the 1936 election played a part in Roberts's vote to 
strike down a New York minimum wage statute in Morehead . .. and to uphold a 
Washington statute in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish .... 
Charles A. Wright, "A Man May Live Greatly in the Law", 70 TEx. L. REv. 505, 516 n.78 
(1991) (citations omitted) (reviewing ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, 0ULD FIELDS, NEW CORNE: THE 
PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF A TWENTIETH CENTURY LAWYER (1992)). 
For his part, Dean Griswold's "public record" is the declaration that Justice Roberts voted 
with the majority in Morehead because counsel for New York did not request overruling Adkins, 
and the statutes were not distinguishable. Although not cited by Griswold, Pusey had previously 
made this assertion publicly in his biography of Hughes. See 2 PuSEY, supra note 6r, at 700-
or. Pusey's biography is, however, cited by Griswold elsewhere in his tribute. See Griswold, 
supra note 86, at 343· In response to my request, Dean Griswold wrote that he does not recall 
ever speaking to Justice Roberts about his votes in Morehead and West Coast Hotel and that a 
thorough knowledge of Justice Roberts and the beginning of the Morehead opinion (which 
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Second, Frankfurter cited Justice Roberts's majority opinion in the 
1934 case of Nebbia v. New York94 as evidence that Justice Roberts 
opposed the "constitutional philosophy" of the four dissenters in West 
Coast Hotel. 95 In Frankfurter's view, Justice Roberts's opinion in 
Nebbia "undermined the foundations of Adkins"96 and allowed Chief 
Justice Hughes to rely "heavily" on Nebbia in writing the majority's 
opinion in West Coast Hotel. 97 Frankfurter suggests that the reader 
can deduce the outcome in West Coast Hotel from Nebbia's logic; 
under this reasoning, Justice Roberts's Nebbia opinion refutes any 
notion that Justice Roberts "switched" in West Coast Hotel. 
Frankfurter's final and most important argument for Justice Rob-
erts's principled decisionmaking, however, was found in a memoran-
dum given to Frankfurter by Roberts, and made public for the first 
time in the tribute. 98 Roberts prepared this memorandum at Frank-
insisted that the petition for certiorari asked to distinguish Adkins, not assess its constitutionality) 
makes it obvious that this was the price of Justice Roberts's vote. See Letter from Erwin N. 
Griswold, former Dean, Harvard Law School, to Michael Ariens, Professor (Mar. 10, 1993) (on 
file at the Harvard Law School Library). But the majority's opinion in Morehead went well 
beyond the confines of its first sentence, and nothing in the public record indicates that Justice 
Roberts disagreed with any part of the Morehead opinion. Additionally, New York counsel did 
request that the Court consider overruling Adkins. See infra note 105. With all deference, I 
am not convinced by Dean Griswold's explanation of Justice Roberts's views, especially because 
Griswold concludes his letter to me by citing Frankfurter's tribute as further evidence. See 
Letter from Erwin N . Griswold to Michael Ariens, supra. 
The editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, however, made special mention 
of the fact that Griswold's tribute exonerating Roberts was written without knowledge of the 
Frankfurter tribute. See Griswold, supra note 86, at 340 n*. However, Frankfurter may have 
been aware of Griswold's tribute before he penned his own tribute to Roberts. A November 
28, 1955 letter from Curtis Reitz to Frankfurter notes that all but Frankfurter's "introductory 
remarks and Mr. Justice Roberts' own memorandum" had been received and edited for publi-
cation. The letter then goes on to state, "I am somewhat apprehensive that further editing may 
be required in order to avoid any unintentional impression that may arise from Dean Griswold's 
treatment of the criticism that Roberts 'switched' votes under political pressure." Letter from 
Curtis R. Reitz , Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, to Justice Felix Frankfurter 
(Nov. 28, 1955), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at 
Container 181. Frankfurter responded on November 30, 1955, by writing, "Your reference to 
Dean Griswold's treatment of the 'switching' judge naturally interests me. Do you suppose you 
could let me see what Dean Griswold has written? It might save you further editing." Letter 
from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Curtis R. Reitz, Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review (Nov. 30, 1955), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note 
78, at Container 181. I have been unable to locate any response to this request in the Frankfurter 
Papers. 
94 291 U.S. 502 (1934) . Because this case was decided by a vote of 5-4, Justice Roberts's 
affirmative vote was decisive. 
95 See Frankfurter, supra note 10, at 316-17. 
96 ld. at 317. 
97 See id. 
98 S ee id. at 314 n. *. In his interview with Merlo Pusey on May 31, 1946, Justice Roberts 
apparently made no mention of having given Justice Frankfurter six months previously any 
memorandum concerning his decision in West Coast Hotel. See Pusey, supra note 83, at 
106-07. 
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furter's request, which, according to Frankfurter, "took not a little 
persuasion. "99 Frankfurter stated that Roberts gave him the memo-
randum on November 9, 1945, after Roberts had resigned from the 
Court. 10° For Frankfurter, Roberts's memorandum confirmed the "in-
dependent" timing defense of Roberts's vote in West Coast Hotel. 
Roberts's memorandum gave the following account: during the week 
of October 5, 1936, Justice Roberts voted to grant certiorari in West 
Coast Hotel, and shortly after the case was argued on December 16 
and 17, 1936, Justice Roberts voted to affirm the lower court's decision 
and uphold the constitutionality of Washington's minimum wage stat-
ute. As Justice Stone was ill and not voting, the Court held over the 
case until his return, because a decision by an evenly divided Court 
was thought an "unfortunate outcome. "101 When the case was again 
taken up on February 6, 1937, Justice Stone's vote to affirm broke 
the tie, and the opinion was then assigned by Chief Justice Hughes 
to himself. It was announced on March 29, 1937. 102 
One difficulty with both the timing and the N ebbia defenses of 
Justice Roberts's "switch" is that neither · sufficiently explains why 
Justice Roberts voted to hold a state minimum wage statute un-
constitutional in Morehead in May 1936 and voted to hold a nearly 
identical statute constitutional ten months later in West Coast Hotel. 
The statements in Roberts's memorandum have become the standard 
revised version of thl:! reasons "synthesizing" the differing decisions: 
because counsel for the state of New York in More head asked only 
that the Court distinguish 103 the Adkins104 precedent, and not overrule 
it, Justice Roberts felt compelled to follow Adkins. Simply put, it 
was the fault of timid and disingenuous counsel for the state of New 
York, who failed to urge the overruling of Adkins. 105 As the memo-
99 Frankfurter, supra note 10, at 314. 
100 See id . at 314 n. *. 
101 /d . at 315. 
102 See id. at 314-15. 
103 Ironically, it was Frankfurter and Ben Cohen who strongly urged that the statute at issue 
in Morehead be drafted in such a way that it would be distinguishable from the Adkins 
precedent. See LASH, supra note 36, at 15-16, 47-50. 
104 Adkins held that a District of Columbia law that mandated a minimum wage violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp. , 261 U.S. 
525, 559 (1923). Arguing on behalf of the constitutionality of the law was then-Professor Felix 
Frankfurter. Justice Brandeis did not participate in the decision because his daughter Elizabeth 
was the secretary of the District of Columbia wage board. See LASH , supra note 36, at 38. 
105 Merlo Pusey made this argument in 1951 in his biography of Charles Evans Hughes. 
Without citing any source, Pusey wrote: "The time was ripe for a bold assault upon Adkins v. 
Children's Hospital. But counsel for New York missed his opportunity. Meekly accepting the 
Adkins ruling, he asked the court only to differentiate the two statutes. Roberts thought that 
reasoning was disingenuous and voted with the conservatives. " 2 PuSEY, supra note 61 , at 701; 
see also Pusey, supra note 83, at 106 (stating that Roberts convinced him that "his chief objective 
at that time had been to avoid making a decision on the vital issue of state minimum-wage 
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randum noted, Justice Roberts had told his brethren, when the peti-
tion for certiorari in More head was discussed in conference, that he 
intended to follow precedent because New York did not urge over-
ruling in Adkins. 
When the Court met in October 1936 to consider whether to grant 
certiorari to cases filed with the Court over the summer, the Roberts 
memorandum states that four members of the majority in More head 
"voted to dismiss the appeal in the Parrish case. "106 The memoran-
dum also states that Roberts voted to note probable jurisdiction, 
although "I am not sure that I gave my reason. "107 Because "the 
authority of Adkins was definitely assailed and the Court was asked 
to reconsider and overrule it," Roberts wrote, "for the first time, I 
was confronted with the necessity of facing the soundness of the 
Adkins case. "108 Although Roberts confessed error in not separately 
legislation against the background of New York's disingenuous arguments"). Frankfurter was 
aware of the argument that New York counsel was disingenuous, because he reviewed the 
Hughes biography for the New York Times and, as his papers indicate, he underlined in his 
own review copy the second sentence quoted above. See Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra 
note 78, at Part III, Reel 39· 
But in I 938, Frankfurter destroyed this argument: 
An examination of the contents of the petition for certiorari affords a conclusive answer 
to the views of the majority. It shows that the petitioner took the broad position that 
the statute was constitutional irrespective of anything decided in the Adkins case. And 
such statements as the sixth reason relied upon for the allowance of the writ, that "The 
circumstances prevailing under which the New York law was enacted call for a recon-
sideration of the Adkins case in light of the New York Act and conditions deemed to be 
remedied thereby," raised the argumentative claim that the Adkins case should no longer 
be followed, expressed as euphemistically as the tactful language of advocacy would 
naturally convey it . 
Felix Frankfurter & Adrian S. Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms , 
1935 and 1936, 51 HARV. L. REv. 577, 634 n.127 (1938). Fisher later became Justice Frank-
furter's first Supreme Court law clerk. 
106 Frankfurter, supra note 10, at 315. 
IOi Jd. 
10s /d. Roberts's claim seems suspect, however, even at first blush. In his 1938 article, 
Frankfurter himself suggested that these "technical barriers of appellate practice" to considering 
the constitutionality of state minimum wage acts in Morehead were inapposite. With respect to 
Justice Roberts, left unnamed in this article, Frankfurter wrote: 
That a Justice who found technical barriers of appellate practice against even considering 
whether the specific objections to minimum wage legislation made by the Adkins case 
had been met by a later statute should, within less than a year, make the majority 
necessary for overruling the Adkins case, cannot have many parallels in the history of 
the Supreme Court. But, within less than a year, the Adkins case was overruled. 
Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 105, at 635-36. 
Furthermore, Professor Richard Friedman informed me that, as of October 12, 1936, the 
Court possessed only the jurisdictional statement of West Coast Hotel , the petitioner. When the 
petition was granted, no papers from either Parrish's counsel or the State of Washington 
requesting that Adkins or Morehead be overruled were before the Court. See Amended State-
ment as to Jurisdiction at 13-14, West Coast Hotel (No. 293), reprinted in 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS 
AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 62, at 90-91. Interestingly, the memorandum itself seems to 
acknowledge that Justice Roberts could not have known that the authority of Adkins was being 
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concurring the previous year in the Morehead case, 109 he concluded 
that "[t]hese facts make it evident that no action taken by the President 
in the interim had any causal relation to my action in the Parrish 
case. "110 
And there you have it. 
B. 
The problem, of course, is that Justice Frankfurter does not deliver 
the promised "indisputable facts," whether by looking at the interstices 
of the United States Reports, by citing Roberts's opinion in Nebbia, 
or by making public Roberts's memorandum. Viewed critically, 111 
Justice Frankfurter's revisionist history raises more questions than it 
answers. These facts do not lead to the conclusion that in the spring 
assailed when he voted to hear the case. See Frankfurter, supra note ro, at 315 ("During the 
conferences [from October 5, 1937 to October ro, 1937] the jurisdictional statement in the 
Parrish case was considered . . . . ") . 
109 See Frankfurter, supra note ro , at 314-15. Justice Roberts's memorandum suggests that 
his decision to make a majority in Morehead , and thus hold the New York law unconstitutional, 
was based completely on precedent. In response to a circulated dissent, Justice Butler's revised 
draft of the majority opinion in Morehead rested on more than the precedent in Adkins and 
sought to sustain Adkins in principle. See Frankfurter, supra note ro, at 314-15. Thus, in 
hindsight, Justice Roberts believed he should have concurred separately. See id. at 315. Charles 
Curtis made a similar argument, suggesting that the vote in West Coast Hotel was probably 
taken shortly after oral argument in mid-December and before the President's announcement. 
If this is true , he writes, "the [court-packing] plan had nothing to do with the decision." CURTIS, 
supra note 79, at r6r. But cf. Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note ros, at 634-36 & n. r27 (noting 
with barely controlled fury that the sixth reason given by the petitioner in More head for granting 
the writ was to reconsider the holding in Adkins). 
!10 Frankfurter, supra note ro, at 315. Interestingly, Justice Roberts's language in this 
memorandum mimics the language used by Chief Justice Hughes in his Biographical Notes. 
See AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF HUGHES, supra note 8r, at 312. This mimicry is especially 
interesting because Justice Frankfurter's handwritten comments in his copy of the Pusey biog-
raphy also note Roberts's failure to state his reasons for voting in Morehead as he did . See 
MERLO J . PuSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (195 I) (Frankfurter's personal copy), microformed 
on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 39 ("He shouldn't have 
suppressed his own views by silence."). 
111 An insightful evaluation of the Roberts memorandum is found in BOBBITT, cited above 
in note rr, at 39-40. A less helpful analysis is David Burner, Owen J. Roberts, in 3 THE 
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT !789-1978: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR 
OPINIONS 2253, 226r-62 (Leon Friedman ed., 1980), in which the author misleadingly states 
that "Justice [Roberts) remembered having been quite prepared to overrule Adkins outright 
.... " /d. at 226r. The memorandum reads: "I said I saw no reason to grant the writ [in 
Morehead] unless the Court were prepared to re-examine and overrule the Adkins case." Frank-
furter, supra note ro, at 314. Thus, Roberts does not say he was ready to overrule Adkins, but 
uses the more lawyerly construction that he believed the Court should not hear the case unless 
it was prepared to overrule Adkins. Because in Roberts 's view the petition for certiorari urged 
the Court to distinguish the statute in Adkins from the statute in Morehead, he may have been 
implying that Adkins should not be disturbed. 
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of 1936 Roberts was "prepared to overrule the Adkins decision. "112 
Aside from the memorandum, Frankfurter offered little evidence that 
was not available in 1937, when Frankfurter himself was among the 
most fervent of those who believed that Roberts had "switched" for 
political reasons. 
1 . - One reason the timing defense fails is that all of Roberts's 
crucial votes occurred after the overwhelming reelection of Roosevelt. 
W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews was decided on November 23, 
1936, and the date of the initial vote in West Coast Hotel was Decem-
ber 19, 1936.113 Also damaging to the timing defense is the fact that 
the Court denied New York's petition to rehear Morehead on October 
12, 1936, the same day the Court announced that certiorari was 
granted in West Coast Hotel.114 
Instead of vindicating Roberts, the timing defense suggests (but 
doesn't prove) the opposite: because the Washington Supreme Court 
had upheld the constitutionality of its state minimum wage statute, 
Roberts's vote to grant certiorari in West Coast Hotel and his vote to 
deny rehearing in More head seemed to foreshadow, before the elec-
tion, another decision that would strike down a state minimum wage 
law. The possibility that Roberts's vote to grant certiorari in West 
Coast Hotel might be so understood seems more plausible given the 
two misstatements in the memorandum: 115 first, because West Coast 
Hotel's jurisdictional statement was the only document before the 
Court as of October 10, 1936, the constitutionality of the holding in 
Adkins could not have been assailed before the petition was granted; 
and second, the question at conference was not whether to dismiss 
the case based on the Adkins and Morehead precedents, but whether 
to reverse it. As Frankfurter acknowledges in a footnote to his tribute, 
112 Frankfurter, supra note ro, at 314. 
113 Perhaps even more importantly, the second vote in West Coast Hotel was taken on 
February 6, 1937, one day after FDR's announcement of his bill to reorganize the federal courts. 
The opinion was not issued until March 29, 1937. See id. at 315 . Although the claim was that 
Justice Roberts's initial vote in West Coast Hotel occurred before the announcement of the plan, 
FDR's announcement almost certainly had a significant effect on the opinion ultimately written 
by Chief Justice Hughes for the majority. · 
114 In the spring of I 93 7, Frankfurter was well aware of this counterargument, having made 
it himself. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone, supra note 51, at r89-90 
("Roberts' somersault [is] incapable of being attributed to a single factor relevant to the professed 
judicial process. Everything that he now subscribes to he rejected not only on June first last, 
but as late as October twelfth when New York's petition for a rehearing was denied."). By 
1955, ·only the interstice of the Reports noting the Court's order in Chamberlin was important. 
liS See Frankfurter, supra note ro, at 315. As Professor Bobbitt notes, "since the Washington 
Supreme Court had sustained the minimum wage statute , Roberts's vote to note probable 
jurisdiction would appear to have an opposite import to the one he remembered." BOBBITT, 
supra note II, at 40. At the end of the memorandum, the manner in which West Coast Hotel 
came before the Court is accurately remembered. See Frankfurter, supra note ro, at 315. 
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because the Washington Supreme Court had upheld the constitution-
ality of the act, "[e]vidently [Roberts] meant [West Coast Hotel] should 
be reversed summarily . ... "116 
2. - West Coast Hotel radically narrowed the Court's role in 
assessing state economic regulation against due process constraints. It 
also overruled Morehead, a case decided only ten months previously. 
Because Justice Roberts joined the majority in both cases but wrote 
an opinion in neither, Justice Frankfurter sought evidence of Roberts's 
principled acceptance of this new "standard of review" in his other 
opinions. The most logical choice was Roberts's majority opinion in 
N ebbia v. New York, 117 which Justice Frankfurter relied on for his 
second argument for the revised history. 
Roberts's vote was necessary for a majority in Nebbia, and Justice 
Frankfurter used the N ebbia opinion as evidence of a change in 
Roberts's "judicial philosophy" well before FDR announced his court-
reorganization plan. But to defend Justice Roberts's vote in West 
Coast Hotel by citing his opinion three years earlier in N ebbia is 
terribly misleading. Even Hughes did not think that Nebbia an-
nounced a change in judicial philosophy. As Pusey notes, "Nebbia v. 
New York is sometimes said to reflect a sharp breaking away from 
the doctrine of the Oklahoma ice case. Chief Justice Hughes did not 
so regard it. "118 More importantly, to accept N ebbia as the crucial 
substantive due process case requires one to ignore both Roberts's 
language in N ebbia and the events of the intervening years. 
The N ebbia opinion looked both forward and backward. It looked 
forward by dispensing with labels or catch-phrases to decide the 
case. 11 9 It looked backward, however, by reaffirming the Court's 
authority substantively to review state economic legislation through 
the Due Process Clause. 120 The Court held in Nebbia that a New 
York law creating a Milk Control Board with the power to fix the 
minimum and maximum price of milk did not violate the Due Process 
11 6 Frankfurter, supra note IO, at 3I5 n* (emphasis added). Curiously, in the Felix Frank-
furter Papers, it is clear from a review of several drafts of the tribute that this footnote was 
added after the initial drafting of the tribute . See Felix Frankfurter, undated draft of Mr. 
Justice Roberts , microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at 
Container I 8 I , at 7. 
117 29I U.S. 502 (I934) . 
118 2 PusEY, supra note 6I, at 700. In his Holmes Lectures, Judge Learned Hand agreed 
with Chief Justice Hughes. "The decision of a bare majority in I 934 that a state may fix the 
price of milk was taken by some people as a coup de grace of the old doctrine, though it really 
should not have been so taken .... "LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 43 (I958) (footnote 
omitted). 
119 See Nebbia, 29I U.S. at 536 (asserting that due process decisions must rest on the 
circumstances of each case, rather than on whether a business is "affected with a public interest" 
or "clothed with a public use"). 
12o See id. at 539 (holding that price control "is unconstitutional ... if arbitrary, discrimi-
natory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt") . 
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Clause. 121 While upholding New York's action, however, Justice Rob-
erts repeatedly emphasized, at no fewer than six places in his opinion, 
the constitutional boundaries on state laws that regulate business: The 
law can be neither "arbitrary" nor "unreasonable. "122 Determining 
whether the regulation is reasonable "depends upon the relevant 
facts. "123 Justice Roberts attempted at length to explain why the New 
York law was reasonable, and thus constitutional. The striking ele-
ment of Roberts's opinion in Nebbia is not its holding, then, but its 
reaffirmation of the Court's role . Important constitutional limitations 
on state action that regulates economic relations remain that the Court 
must police. But although Justice Roberts's opinion was "modern" in 
the sense that it discarded the "affected with a public interest" doc-
trine, the opinion also made it clear that the Court's role in deciding 
economic substantive due process cases had been altered only in de-
gree, not in kind. The result is that Justice Roberts's opinion in 
Nebbia is strikingly different in both force and tone from Chief Justice 
Hughes's language in West Coast Hotel, in which he wrote that "[t]he 
adoption of [minimum wage laws] by many States evidences a deep-
seated conviction both as to the presence of the evil and as to the 
means adapted to check it. Legislative response to that conviction 
cannot be regarded as arbitrary or capricious, and that is all we have 
to decide ."124 It is the conclusory statements in West Coast Hotel, 
and not Roberts's opinion in N ebbia, that indicate the real change in 
judicial role. 
Indications of a shift in 1934 were premature. Cases decided after 
Nebbia and before West Coast Hotel show that demanding substantive 
review remained the norm in cases involving socioeconomic legisla-
tion . Morehead , the next substantive due process case after Nebbia, 
was also the only substantive due process case that the Court decided 
between 1934 and 1937. In Morehead , Justice Roberts voted to strike 
down the minimum wage law. 125 Further, the Court's decision in 
12 1 See id. 
122 /d . at 52 1, 52 5, 530, 536, 537, 539· 
123 Id. at 525. 
124 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937). 
125 The Morehead dissenters cited Nebbia as precedent for their position, see Morehead v. 
New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S . 587, 625 (1936) (Hughes, C.J ., dissenting), but Roberts 
apparently was able to reconcile the "judicial philosophy" behind the two cases. That N ebbia 
did not indicate a change in philosophical position by Roberts may be reflected in Ashton v. 
Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. , 298 U.S. 51 3 (1936), decided one week before 
M orehead . The federal statute at issue in Ashton was originally passed in 1934 to aid a large 
number of debt-stricken local governmental entities. S ee id . at 527 . Justice Roberts joined 
Justice McReynolds's majority opinion , which concluded that Congress's power to establish 
uniform laws, on bankruptcy did not extend to including bankruptcy protections to a political 
subdivision of a state. See id . at 52 7, 530. Justice McReynolds reached this conclusion because 
he believed that any other conclusion would violate the principles of federalism, even though 
state consent was necessary fo r the subdivision to utilize the bankruptcy law. See id. at 531. 
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N ebbia did not resolve all of the legal questions about the constitu-
tionality of the New York law. One year after Nebbia was decided, 
a unanimous Court gutted the statute upheld in N ebbia by concluding 
that its application to interstate sales of milk violated the Commerce 
Clause.126 
During the October 1935 Term, the Supreme Court decided two 
more cases involving the constitutionality of the amended New York 
Milk Control Act. Justice Roberts wrote both decisions. 127 In both 
cases, milk producers claimed that the amended Act violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. In the first case, Borden's Farm Products 
Co. v. Ten Eyck, 128 Justice Roberts concluded that the State's decision 
to permit the sale of unadvertised milk for up to one cent per quart 
less than the price of advertised milk did not violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause as applied to dealers, such as Borden's, that had a 
well-advertised trade name. 129 Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, 
Sutherland, and Butler dissented. 130 Shortly after announcing the 
Borden's Farm decision, Justice Roberts announced the Court's deci-
sion in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck. 131 The Court held that 
another provision of the amended Milk Control Act, which prohibited 
unadvertised dealers who began selling milk after the date of the 
original Milk Control Act from receiving the price differential benefit 
upheld in Borden's Farm, was arbitrary and unreasonable and thus 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 132 This time, Justice Cardozo 
dissented, joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone.l33 
Roberts's opinions in these two cases ·suggest that Nebbia did not 
signal a change in his view of the Court's role in assessing economic 
legislation challenged on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In a rare occurrence, possibly foreshadowing Morehead, Chief Justice Hughes joined the dis-
senting opinion of Justice Cardozo. 
126 See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 5II, 521-22 (1935). 
127 See Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 270-74 (1936); Borden's Farm 
Prod. Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251, 256-64 (1936) . The Supreme Court had also twice 
visited the milk-control law after deciding Nebbia and before deciding these two cases. See 
Borden's Farm Prod. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 203-13 (1934) (holding that a complaint 
that alleged a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses stated a cause of action 
and remanding for findings of fact and conclusions of law); Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 
293 U.S. 163, 168-72 (1934) (holding unanimously that a bill of complaint requesting an 
injunction against enforcement of the act failed to state a cause of action). In Borden's Farm 
v. Baldwin , Roberts voted with the majority. Concurring in the result were Justices Stone and 
Cardozo. 
128 297 U.S. 251 (1936). 
129 See id. at 261. 
I30 See id. at 264-65 (McReynolds, J. , dissenting). 
131 297 u.s. 266 (1936). 
132 See id. at 274. 
133 See id. at 274-78 (Cardozo, J ., dissenting). 
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Mayflower Farms evidences Justice Roberts's continued willingness in 
early 1936 to use the constitutional boundaries reiterated in Nebbia to 
strike down state economic legislation. In Mayflower Farms, as in 
Nebbia, the judge's role was to determine whether the regulation was 
"arbitrary" or "unreasonable" after properly weighing the relevant facts 
and circumstances in the case before him. 134 Justice Roberts was able 
to distinguish the Borden's Farm and Mayflower Farms cases because, 
as he had written in N ebbia, "a regulation valid for one sort of 
business, or in given circumstances, may be invalid for another sort, 
or for the same business under other circumstances, because the rea-
sonableness of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts. "135 
Only two years before Nebbia, in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 136 
the Supreme Court, in an opinion joined by Justice Roberts, had held 
unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute regulating entry into the ice-
making and selling business upon a showing of business necessity. 137 
Nebbia was the only substantive due process case decided after New 
State Ice and before Morehead. Nebbia did not mark a turn in the 
Court's economic substantive due process cases; one can more easily 
draw a line connecting New State Ice and Morehead than connecting 
Nebbia and West Coast Hotel. 
3. - Frankfurter's last piece of evidence, the Roberts memoran-
dum, proved crucial in providing support for the revisionist history. 
Not only did this document reveal the previously private deliberations 
of Roberts, but it also bolstered the timing defense and allowed Frank-
furter to argue that Roberts's change in "judicial philosophy" came 
before the announcement of FDR's court-packing plan. 
The relevance of the proof found in the memorandum, however, 
is difficult to determine. First, I have several reservations concerning 
the existence of this memorandum. This exculpatory memorandum 
seems out of place given Roberts's self-effacing character, 138 particu-
134 See id. at 272; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 , 525 (1934); see also Letter from 
Owen J. Roberts to Felix Frankfurter (May 20, 1930), microformed on Harvard Frankfurter 
Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 3 ("It seems to me that in every case, when all of the 
facts and circumstances are clearly understood and properly weighed, there is a position that 
must be eternally right."). 
135 Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 525 . 
136 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
137 See id. at 278. In New State Ice , Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts joined 
Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler in the majority. Justice Brandeis, 
joined by Justice Stone, dissented. Justice Cardozo did not vote in the case. See also Heiner 
v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 322 (1932) (holding violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment a federal tax provision declaring gifts made within two years of donor's death as 
made in contemplation of death). The decision in Heiner was announced on the same day as 
New State Ice, and the vote was identical. 
138 See Frankfurter, supra note ro, at 3 r 2 ("Who am I to revile the good God that he did 
not make me a Marshall, a Taney, a Bradley, a Holmes, a Brandeis or a Cardozo" (quoting 
Roberts)) . 
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larly given his attempt, in his "judicial executor" letter to Frankfurter, 
to avoid any encomiums or justifications of his work as a Supreme 
Court Justice. 139 It also seems odd that the memorandum would have 
been "given" to Frankfurter by Roberts on November 9, 1945, three 
months after he had resigned and returned to Pennsylvania. 140 The 
accuracy of this date seems even more implausible given that the 
Supreme Court was in session. Further, the Court's inability to agree 
on the contents of a letter that would recognize Roberts's service, and 
Roberts's disgust with some members of the Court, make it unlikely 
that Roberts would have traveled to the Court from Pennsylvania to 
"give" Frankfurter this memorandum. 141 Furthermore, Roberts's cor-
139 I realize that this argument, based on my evaluation of Roberts's character, is the fiipside 
of the argument made by Griswold. See Griswold, supra note 86, at 347-49. Clearly, Roberts 
wanted nothing to do with memorial tributes. In addition to his "judicial executor" letter of 
1944, see supra note 86, Roberts wrote Frankfurter in November 1947 the following on the 
back of an invitation to a memorial tribute to McReynolds: 
Think of the lying and hypocracy [sic] that will be exhibited! I think I shall have nausea 
from r r to 4 on November r2th. I once reposed a trust in you [sic] I do not say you 
betrayed that trust. I do say that, at the lowest, you miserably failed . I shiver when I 
think that what is to happen to HFS [Harlan Fiske Stone] and J.C. MeR. [McReynolds] 
may happen to me. Shall I depend on you to forfeit it, or shall I write to the efficient 
Marshal of the Court? 
Note from Justice Owen Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 1947), microformed on 
Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 3· 
140 Professor Friedman suggested to me that the genesis of the Roberts memorandum is 
related to the disastrous attempt by Chief Justice Stone to write a valedictory letter on behalf 
of the members of the Court to Roberts upon Roberts's resignation. The second paragraph of 
the draft of this letter contained as the final sentence, "You have made fidelity to principle your 
guide to decision." Draft Letter from Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Justice Owen J . 
Roberts (no date), microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III , Reel 
4· Justice Black refused to accept this sentence, which outraged Frankfurter. See Letter from 
Justice Felix Frankfurter to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (Aug. 20, 1945), microformed on 
Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 4· As a result, no letter was sent. 
Frankfurter later sent a copy of the letters and Frankfurter's own file about this affair to Paul 
Freund for Freund's history of the Hughes and Stone Courts. See Letter from Justice Felix 
Frankfurter to Paul A. Freund, Professor, Harvard Law School (July r6, 1958) (on file at the 
Harvard Law School Library). 
I disagree with Professor Friedman for several reasons. First, Frankfurter's correspondence 
to Freund in 1958 suggested that this episode showed why he denigrated Stone. It was not 
given to Freund to defend Roberts. See id. Second, Frankfurter believed that this episode was 
another example of Black's unfitness to serve on the Supreme Court. Nothing in Frankfurter's 
1945 diary mentions the Roberts valedictory letter episode, but there is a note in that diary 
concerning Black's refusal to recuse himself in the Jewell Ridge case, decided in favor of the 
union because of Black's vote. See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6r67, United Mine 
Workers of America, 325 U.S. r6r, r6r (1945). Black's former law partner had represented the 
union before the Court. See LASH, supra note 84, at 263-64. Third, there is neither a direct 
nor an indirect attack on either Black or Stone in the Roberts tribute , which I would have 
expected if there were a connection between the memorandum and the failed letter episode. 
Finally, there is no statement in the tribute along the lines of, "He made fidelity to principle 
his guide to decision." 
141 Professor Philip Kurland, Frankfurter's clerk during the October 1945 Term, has informed 
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respondence with Frankfurter mentions no meeting between the two 
from October 1945 through January 1946. 142 Additionally, Frank-
furter's correspondence with the editors of the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review makes it clear that the draft tribute sent to the 
law review contained no information explaining the creation of the 
memorandum. Only after an editor, prompted by some members of 
the faculty, wrote Frankfurter that there was some "feeling that some 
readers may be confused over when and why the memorandum was 
written,"143 did Frankfurter add the information about the date of the 
memorandum. 144 Finally, the original memorandum is apparently 
lost. Roberts destroyed his papers; thus, a copy is not available 
me that, to his knowledge, Roberts did not visit the Court during that Term. Telephone 
Interview with Philip B. Kurland, Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago Law School (Dec. 
3, 1993). 
142 Further, I have found no memorandum from Roberts to Frankfurter of any sort dated 
November 9, 1945, in the Felix Frankfurter Papers. Because that date fell on a Friday, it is 
possible that Roberts traveled to Washington on that date to spend the weekend and met with 
Frankfurter. The Frankfurter Papers contain letters from Roberts to Frankfurter dated July 
16, 1945 , July 28, 1945, August 6, 1945, August 30, 1945, October 2, 1945 , December 26, 1945 
(2 letters) , and January 12, 1946. None of these letters refers to any memorandum in any way. 
See Letters from Justice Owen]. Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter (July 16, 1945 ; July 28, 
1945; Aug. 6, 1945 ; Aug. 30, 1945; Oct. 2, 1945; Dec . 26, 1945 (two letters); Jan. 12 , 1946), 
microformed on Harvard Felix Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78 , at Part III, Reel 3· In a 
letter written to Justice Frankfurter and dated January 12, 1946, Roberts notes: 
I've been to Washington quite often on Clemency Board and [???] and [???] Board 
business; more often than not I go down on an early train and return the same day. 
Once or twice I've spent the night at Elizabeth's house, but I've been on such a full 
schedule that I've had no chance to see my friends. I'm looking forward to better luck 
in the corning months. 
Letter from Justice Owen]. Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Jan . 12, 1946), microformed 
on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 3· This indicates, but does 
not prove, that Roberts and Frankfurter had not seen each other for some time before the date 
of the letter. It does appear, from the October 2, 1945 , letter, that Frankfurter had visited 
Roberts at Roberts's farmhouse at some time in September 1945, as he occasionally did before 
returning to Washington for the opening of the Court's Term. See Letter from Justice Owen J . 
Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Oct. 2, 1945), microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, 
supra note 7 8, at Part III, Reel 3. 
143 Letter from Arthur W. Leibold, Jr., Article Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 18, 1956), microformed on Library of Congress 
Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Container 18r. Indeed, Leibold erroneously thought that 
the memorandum had been written by Roberts "shortly before he died with the express purpose 
that it be published." I d. 
l44 See Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Arthur W. Leibold, Jr., Article Editor, 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (Jan. 20, 1956), microformed on Library of Congress 
Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Container 18r. Frankfurter's response was, in pertinent 
part: 
The members of your Faculty are quite right and I am obliged to them for bringing me 
to an explicit statement of the history and the date of the. memorandum. I should have 
done it in my original draft, but in an irrelevant kind of way I had a little feeling against 
cluttering up a little piece like the one I wrote with the usual footnote apparatus. 
/d . The date was, of course, not the only footnote in the tribute. 
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through that collection. 145 In the mid-rg6os, historian John Chambers 
searched the Frankfurter Papers inconclusively for the original or a 
copy of the memorandum. 146 I have been unable to find the original 
memorandum or a copy in my searches through the Frankfurter Pa-
pers. No one with whom I have spoken remembers ever seeing the 
original memorandum. 147 The absence of the memorandum obviously 
145 See LEONARD, supra note 86, at 184. 
146 See John W. Chambers, The Big Switch: Justice Roberts and the Minimum Wage Cases, 
10 LABOR HIST. 44, 64 n.96 (1969). This footnote suggests that Chambers located the memo-
randum. The language is quite vague, however, and on close inspection, it appears that at 
most what he found was a copy of something that seemed to be the memorandum. When I 
located this note , I called the Library of Congress and asked them to send the document to me. 
They were unable to find any such document in either set of Frankfurter papers. My research 
assistant, Connie Liem, later traveled to the Library of Congress in an attempt to locate this 
document. Again, with the assistance of the Library of Congress staff, no such document was 
found . I have looked via microfilm through both sets of papers for this document without 
success. I have found, however, a typescript copy of unsigned, undated material in the draft 
of the tribute that is identical to the published memorandum. See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice 
Roberts 6-8 (no date) (unpublished draft), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter 
Papers, supra note 78 , at Container 18r. 
14 7 I have spoken with Judge Thomas O'Neill , at the time a clerk to Justice Harold Burton, 
who apparently acted as an initial intermediary between Frankfurter and the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, and he has no recollection of seeing the memorandum. Telephone 
Interview with Judge Thomas O'Neill (May 24, 1993). The editor-in-chief of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review at the time, Curtis Reit2, now a Professor at his alma mater, also 
has no recollection of ever seeing the Roberts memorandum, although he did recall that Frank-
furter was anxious to get the information it contained into print. Telephone Interview with 
Curtis Reitz, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School (May 27, 1993). Article editor 
Arthur Leibold, whose January 18, 1956, letter to Frankfurter led to Frankfurter's footnote 
explaining the circumstances surrounding the creation of the memorandum, also has no recol-
lection of ever seeing the memorandum. Telephone Interview with Arthur W. Leibold, Jr. , 
Dechert, Price & Rhoads, Washington, D.C. (June 1, 1993). Harvard Law School Professor 
Andrew Kaufman, one of Frankfurter's two clerks during the October 1955 Term, did not work 
on the tribute and thus does not recall seeing the Roberts memorandum. He does recall, 
however, that Frankfurter worked on the tribute privately. Telephone Interview with Andrew 
Kaufman , Professor, Harvard Law School (June 3, 1993). Frankfurter's other clerk for that 
year, New York Law School Dean Harry A. Wellington, does not recall ever seeing the 
memorandum or working on the tribute . Telephone Interview with Harry A. Wellington, Dean, 
New York Law School (June 8, 1993). Professor Philip Kurland, Frankfurter's clerk during 
the October 1945 Term, did not see the memorandum, although he further explained that this 
information was not the type of information that Frankfurter would share with his clerks. 
Telephone Interview with Philip B. Kurland, Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago Law 
School (Dec. 3, 1993). Professor Richard D. Friedman, who has replaced the late Paul Freund 
as the author of a history of the Hughes Court in the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, has stated that he has not located the Roberts 
memorandum in Freund's files on the Hughes Court. Telephone Interview with Richard D. 
Friedman , Professor, University of Michigan Law School (June 15 , 1993). 
The only possible note from Roberts to Frankfurter I have found that might relate to a 
"switch" is a handwritten note by Roberts which states in its entirety, "I do realize it, and often 
wonder why the hell I did it just to please the Chief!" Note from Justice Owen ]. Roberts to 
Justice Felix Frankfurter (no date), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfu~ter Papers, 
supra note 78, at Container 97. On the other side of this note is a handwritten note by 
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prevents independent analysis of Roberts's views. The memorandum's 
absence from the Frankfurter Papers also strikes me as odd, because 
Frankfurter seemed at an early date to keep thorough records, even 
of things that had much less historic importance. 
Second, even if Roberts authored the memorandum printed in 
Frankfurter's tribute, several factors cast doubt on the accuracy of its 
contents. The tribute itself indicates that the memorandum was writ-
ten more than eight years after the crisis of I 93 7, after Roberts had 
resigned from the bench, and after repeated requests from Frank-
furter. The memorandum was to be made public at Frankfurter's 
discretion (likely only after Roberts's death), and contained two dis-
turbing factual errors. 148 If the memorandum was written in 1945, 
only three of Roberts's colleagues were alive - Hughes, McReynolds, 
and Stone - and by September 1948, Roberts was the sole survivor 
of the 1937 Court: therefore, no one was alive to question Roberts's 
actions as detailed in the memorandum. In 1951, Hughes's "princi-
pled" explanation of the voting in West Coast Hotel was also publicly 
available. 149 
Frankfurter: "[To] O.].R. I hope you now realize what a door you opened in your - shall I 
say- much-discussed Butler decision as to scope of 'general welfare.'" Jd . The cataloguers 
estimated that this message was written in November 1940. Professor Friedman directed my 
attention to another version of this statement by Roberts; it can be found as a liner note located 
at page 66 of Volume 297 of a set of the United States Reports owned by Frankfurter and kept 
in his home study. That page of the Reports contains a broad statement, written by Roberts , 
of Congress's general welfare power in the case of United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (1936), 
in which the Court declared unconstitutional the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 as beyond 
Congress's power to spend for the general welfare, see id. at 74-75 . In Frankfurter's handwriting 
appears the identical colloquy as quoted above. See id. at 66 (Felix Frankfurter's personal copy 
in the possession of Andrew Kaufman, Professor, Harvard Law School; copy on file at the 
Harvard Law School Library). If anything, these notes appear to support the belief that in 
1936 Roberts was more firmly opposed to a broad interpretation of Congress's powers, and thus 
to New Deal measures , than previously believed. It also supports the belief that Hughes 
influenced the writing of Butler in a way that would later lead to a more congenial reception 
by the Court to New Deal legislation. The dictum was used in 1937 by the new Court majority 
in the Social Security Cases to construe Congress's power in a broad fashion . See Helvering 
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 592-
93 (1937). 
148 The Roberts memorandum erroneously indicates that the Washington Supreme Court in 
West Coast Hotel had held that the minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. See Frank-
furter, supra note ro, at 315. At the end of the memorandum, however, this error is corrected; 
Roberts noted that the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in West Coast Hotel. 
See id. The initial draft of the tribute did not contain Frankfurter's note on this mistake. See 
id. at 315 n. *. The note was added to the tribute when Frankfurter edited it. See Frankfurter, 
supra note 146, at 7. The Roberts memorandum also erroneously states that the constitutional 
validity of the holding in Adkins was assailed in the papers before the Court when probable 
jurisdiction was noted. See Frankfurter, supra note ro, at 315. The only document before the 
Court when it granted probable jurisdiction was the jurisdictional statement of the hotel , which 
wanted the Court to decide based on Adkins and Morehead, not to overrule them. See Amended 
Statement as to Jurisdiction at 13-14, West Coast Hotel (No. 293), supra note ro8 , at 90-91. 
149 Part of the typed version of Hughes's Biographical Notes, including Hughes's defense of 
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Third, and maybe even more perplexing, is what the memorandum 
does not contain, namely, an explanation for some of Roberts's other 
votes in spring 193 7. 15° The memorandum does not speak of the 
reasons for Roberts's votes with the majority in Jones & Laughlin 
Steel and the Social Security Cases. 15 1 As discussed above, 152 the 
former, which broadly interpreted Congress's Commerce Clause 
power, effectively overruled the 1936 case Carter v. Carter Coal Co ., 153 
his and Roberts's actions in deciding West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin Steel, can be 
found in the Frankfurter Papers. See Charles E. Hughes, Biographical Notes 26-28 (manu-
script), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Container 
216. 
ISO This lacuna in the memorandum was noted in a letter by Professor Wallace Mendelson, 
who corresponded with Frankfurter after publication of the Roberts tribute. Mendelson had 
previously accepted the original history, as evidenced in a 1951 book review of Hendel's 
biography of Hughes. Mendelson wrote, "I remember (with the author) Hughes' letter to the 
Senate, backed by a timely switch of position on the bench. That the letter and switch (along 
with that of Mr. Justice Roberts) pretty certainly saved nine, is now generally conceded- and 
one would have to be more na[i]ve than is permissible to suppose that Hughes intended 
otherwise." Wallace Mendelson, Book Review, 45 AM. PoL. Scr. REv. 570 , 570 (1951) (review-
ing SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVAN HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1951)). After 
publication of the Roberts tribute , Mendelson wrote Frankfurter, "[D]oesn't [Roberts's] concern 
to be understood in the Minimum Wage cases imply a confession of 'guilt' for 'switching' in the 
Commerce Clause cases?" Letter from Wallace Mendelson, Professor, University of Tennessee, 
to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 15, 1956), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter 
Papers, supra note 78, at Container 209. Frankfurter responded by explaining that his tribute 
was intended to show that Roberts had not "switched" because of Roosevelt's court plan and 
by claiming that the Commerce Clause decisions were not a reflection of a change in position 
caused by the court-packing plan. See Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Wallace Men-
delson, Professor (Mar. 19, 1956), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers, 
supra note 78, at Container 209. Six weeks later Frankfurter wrote another letter to Mendelson. 
He stated, "Roberts was specifically charged with having changed his position on a specific 
issue, i .e. , the validity of minimum wage legislation in the West Coast case, allegedly in response 
to the President's 'Court-packing' plan . It is that specific , and what I would regard dishonorable , 
change [sic) that I was repelling. " Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Wallace Mendelson, 
Professor (May 4, 1956), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note 
78, at Container 209 . 
That Roberts would be accused of a "switch" with regard to a state law, and not with regard 
to New Deal legislation, is not sensible , and in fact, Roberts and Hughes were accused by 
scholars and others of switching with regard to both state and federal legislation. In his tribute 
to Roberts , Griswold argued that Roberts's votes in Jones & Laughlin Steel and the Social 
Security Cases were "fully explicable simply as a natural development of his views." Griswold, 
supra note 86, at 345· Even Hughes, in his Biographical Notes, argues that the Court remained 
independent from political considerations in both West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin Steel. 
See AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF HUGHES, supra note 81, at 312-13; see also PuSEY, supra 
note 56, at 5 r-53 (discussing the change in position of Hughes and Roberts in West Coast Hotel 
and Jones & Laughlin Steel). Frankfurter's focus on the narrowness of the criticism in his 
explanation to Mendelson is thus wholly unsatisfactory. 
lSI See Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 6r9 (1937). The court-packing plan was still alive in Congress when these cases were 
decided on May 24, 1937. 
152 See supra p. 629. 
ISJ 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
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in which Roberts had voted with the majority. The latter cases 
distinguished into oblivion the opinion written by Roberts one year 
before in United States v. Butler. 154 Additionally, the memorandum 
never explains why Roberts failed to write a separate opinion in 
More head. It offers instead a mea culpa. (Did the press of work 
cause him to fall behind in his opinion-writing duties?) 
C. 
Frankfurter's handwritten comments, as well as his silence, in his 
copy of Pusey's biography of Hughes cast further doubt on the sig-
nificance, if not existence, of the memorandum. These notes make 
no reference to the existence of the memorandum, and Frankfurter's 
hand-written comments are in fact quite critical of Roberts's actions. 
Frankfurter underlined the following sentence in Pusey's biography, 
which concerned Morehead: "But counsel for New York missed his 
opportunity. "155 Frankfurter noted, "Too dogmatic. Serious question 
whether to call for overruling rather than differentiating. "156 On the 
same page, after underlining the sentence, "[Morehead's] reactionary 
tone was very distasteful to Roberts," Frankfurter wrote further, "He 
shouldn't have suppressed his own views by silence."157 At the point 
at which Pusey discussed the West Coast Hotel decision, Frankfurter 
offered in the margin an explanation he used four years later in his 
tribute to Roberts. Frankfurter's handwritten comment was , "In West 
Coast Hotel [the] issue of overruling Adkins had to be faced [and] 
Roberts had been ready to do that, but ... wasn't asked in Ti-
paldo . "158 From this note, it seems possible to conclude that Frank-
furter had discussed the minimum wage cases with Roberts . It re-
mains unclear, however, whether the liner notes were supposed to 
become part of the effort to set the record straight, or whether they 
were notes designed to present a plausible explanation of Roberts's 
actions. Further, it seems odd that, in his personal copy of Pusey's 
biography, Frankfurter's liner notes made no mention of a memoran-
dum that should have been in his possession for nearly six years . 
Instead of marginalia criticizing Roberts's actions, a sympathetic reader 
armed with a memorandum from Roberts himself probably would 
have either ignored Pusey's interpretation or noted agreement with 
Pusey's sympathetic treatment of Roberts . After all, Frankfurter be-
154 297 U.S. 1 (1936). This last "switch" has largely been ignored. But see Griswold, supra 
note 86, at 345 (concluding that Roberts's votes in the Jones & Laughlin Steel and the Social 
Security Cases were "a natural development of his views"). 
15 5 MERLO J. PuSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 701 (1951 ) (Frankfurter's personal copy), 
microj ormed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III , Reel 39· 
156 Jd. 
157 Jd . 
158 Jd. 
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lieved in late I955 that the memorandum from Roberts explained 
Roberts's differing decisions in Morehead and West Coast Hotel as 
based on the requests by counsel to distinguish or to overrule Adkins. 
Frankfurter's published review of Pusey's biography made no men-
tion of the court-packing fight; 159 it did, however, note that application 
of the Constitution "is not a mechanical exercise, but a profound task 
of statecraft exercised by judges set apart from the turbulence of 
politics. "160 This review, along with Frankfurter's private notes, 
shows Frankfurter's strong concern for the proper role of the Court. 
The notes may also suggest Frankfurter's willingness to revise history 
to preserve the sanctity of the Court. 
v. 
And the print spilled on Justice Roberts' "switch in time," a matter of 
great import to frankfurterians, has similarly needlessly polluted our 
rivers and streams. 
]OHN H. SCHLEGEL, THE LINE BETWEEN 
HISTORY AND CASENOTE161 
What is most important about Frankfurter's tribute is its effect: 
his revised history of the constitutional crisis of I 93 7 became the 
accepted history in legal academia. This new version allowed legal 
academics to conclude that the decisions of Justice Roberts in the 
spring of I 93 7 were the product of legal reflection, not political pres-
sure. How the revised history became the accepted history is the 
subject of this Part; why it became the accepted history is the subject 
of Part VI. This Part describes the manner in which Frankfurter's 
history became the accepted history through law review articles and 
books, constitutional law casebooks, the works of Paul Freund, polit-
ical scientists, and Frankfurter's biographers. 
A. 
The virtually unanimous acceptance by legal academics of Frank-
furter's explanation, and the swiftness of its acceptance within the 
legal academy, are worth recounting in detail. One reason for the 
rapid acceptance of the revised history was the prominent position of 
its author in legal academia. This prominence, in turn, secured broad 
dissemination of Frankfurter's writing. The tribute was not only 
159 See Felix Frankfurter, The Impact of Charles Evans Hughes, N .Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 
1951 , § 7, at I, 51 (reviewing MERLO]. PuSEY, CHARLES EVAN HUGHES (1951)), reprinted in 
OF LAW AND MEN 144, 144-50 (Philip Elman ed. , 1956). 
160 /d . at 149· 
161 Schlegel, supra note 3, at 975 . 
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published in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, but it was 
also included in Of Law and Men, 162 a compilation of Frankfurter's 
writings published in I956. 
From there, Frankfurter's revised history of the constitutional crisis 
of I 93 7 spread quickly throughout legal academia. Citing Frank-
furter, Bernard Schwartz suggested in a I957 book that the Court's 
opinion in West Coast Hotel was decided on constitutional and not 
political grounds, and that the same decision would have been handed 
down even without the presence of FDR's plan. 163 In I959, the first 
law review article to cite Frankfurter's tribute adopted Frankfurter's 
claim: "The probable truth, while not subject to categorical demon-
stration, is that the change in the course of decisions, evident by the 
spring of I 93 7, was not induced by the threat of 'packing,' but was 
instead the product of a number of factors coinciding at that time. "164 
In a lecture given in I96o, Professor Herbert Wechsler cited Frank-
furter's tribute for the proposition that Roberts's vote in West Coast 
Hotel was "falsely publicized."165 A I963 book edited by Alan Westin, 
a professor of government at Columbia, reprinted Frankfurter's tribute 
and added that for Frankfurter "[t]o have known 'what really hap-
pened' while many historians and political scientists were weaving 
elaborate myths about the Court's switch in I937 must have been a 
heavy burden."166 In I965, Harvard Law School Professor Arthur 
Sutherland cited Frankfurter and concluded that Roberts's vote in 
West Coast Hotel was unrelated to the court-packing plan and that 
Roberts's vote in Jones & Laughlin Steel "need not be ascribed to 
personal or institutional panic. Persuasion sometimes comes, after a 
while, from the logic of events. "167 In an exhaustive history of the 
court-packing plan, Leonard Baker concluded that the question of 
Roberts's reasons for changing his vote was "without a positive an-
swer. "168 Amazingly, even Frankfurter's bitter rival William 0. Doug-
162 Frankfurter, supra note 10, reprinted in OF LAW AND MEN, supra note 159, at 204, 
204-12. 
163 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN 
RETROSPECT 20 & n.38 (1957). 
164 Robert B . McKay, The Supreme Court and Its Lawyer Critics, 28 FORDHAM L. REv. 
615, 628 (1959) (footnote omitted). 
165 Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. 
REv. 465, 465 (1961) (footnote omitted). The reason for Wechsler's aside was that this article 
was originally given as the Owen ] . Roberts Memorial Lecture. 
166 ALAN F. WESTIN, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT 241 (1963). Westin 
dedicated the book, "To Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter - scholar of the Constitution, wherever 
he sits." Jd. at vii. 
16 7 ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 499 (1965). 
168 BAKER, supra note 11, at 177. Baker would later author a dual biography of Louis D . 
Brandeis and Frankfurter. See LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL 
BIOGRAPHY (1984); see also BAKER, supra note 51, at 189 (concluding that the switch likely 
resulted from "the rising clamor against the Court"); WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND 
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las vouched for Frankfurter's revised history. In his autobiography 
Go East, Young Man, Douglas defends Roberts from claims that 
Roberts switched. 169 Citing Frankfurter's tribute, and relying on the 
timing of Roberts's initial vote in West Coast Hotel, in late-December 
1936, Douglas triumphantly concluded, "Thus do journalists and 
others on the sidelines often jump to wrong conclusions. "17° 
This revised history has largely filtered down to the present. A 
number of articles in the Journal of Supreme Court History conclude 
that there was no "switch" in 1937.l71 In a recent article, Harvard 
Law School Professor Emeritus Benjamin Kaplan cited Frankfurter's 
tribute for the proposition that "Roberts' role in this [switch] has 
perhaps been too harshly criticized. "172 Professor David Currie, au-
thor of a recent two-volume history of constitutional law in the Su-
preme Court, wholly adopts the revised history. 173 Currie cites Frank-
CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE NEW LEGALITY, I932-I968 , at 79 (I970) 
("Whether Hughes had engineered this turn of events as a matter of basic professional conviction 
or as a matter of political opportunism - and in the nature of the circumstances, there was an 
inevitable admixture of these - the fact was that he had carried the thing off with brilliance 
and aplomb."). Swindler neither cites Frankfurter's tribute nor discusses at all Roberts's role in 
the constitutional revolution of I937 · See id. 
169 See WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 325-26 (I974). Douglas's defense of 
Roberts's actions in I93 7 stands in stark contrast to his refusal in 1945 to join a valedictory 
letter to Roberts upon his retirement as long as the letter contained the sentence, "You have 
made fidelity to principle your guide to decision." See supra note 140. 
I70 DoUGLAS, supra note 169, at 326. Douglas expends a great deal of effort attacking 
Frankfurter for telling Douglas that he opposed the plan while writing letters to FDR in support 
of it. See id. at 324. Douglas's defense of Roberts is predicated in part on attacking Frankfurter. 
"The only prevaricator was Frankfurter, who had been promised a seat on the Court and was 
swinging along with FDR as the price of getting it." Id . at 327 . Although Douglas was 
convinced that he had skewered Frankfurter, the last laugh may belong to Frankfurter. 
171 See Pusey, supra note 83 , at 106 (concluding that Roberts did not switch as a result of 
FDR's court plan); Merlo ]. Pusey, The Hughes Biography: Some Personal R eflections, 1984 
Y.B. SuP. CT. HIST. Soc'Y 45 , 46 (same); Robert L. Stern, The Court-Packing Plan and the 
Commerce Clause , I988 Y.B . SuP. CT. HIST. Soc'Y 9I , 96 (concluding that it was plausible 
that Hughes was consistent in his Commerce Clause votes, but that "Roberts's opinions and 
votes in I 935 and I 936 are difficult to reconcile with his joining in the Labor Board decisions 
in I937 "). Stern wrote in 1946 that government lawyers were convinced that FDR's court-
packing plan was the basis for the Court's reversal . See Stern, supra note 73, at 68I-82 . In 
1988, Stern wrote , "The speculation in my 1946 article ... implies much more certainty on the 
subject than I now have." Stern , supra, at 96; cf. Warner W. Gardner, Court Packing: The 
Drafting Recalled, I990 J . SuP. CT. HIST. 99, I02 (noting that the timing of the West Coast 
Hotel vote suggests that Roberts and Hughes may have changed without regard to the court-
packing plan). But see Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. , A Personalized View of the Court-Packing Plan, 
I990 J . SuP. CT. HIST. 93, 97 (concluding that Roberts's switch in Jones & Laughlin Steel 
could have resulted only from the court-packing plan). 
172 Benjamin Kaplan , The Great Civil Rights Case of Hague v. CIO: Notes of a Survivor, 
25 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 913, 931 (I99I). 
173 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND 
CENTURY I888-I986, at 236 (1990) . 
1994] A THRICE-TOLD TALE 655 
furter and Pusey for the proposition that Roberts voted in West Coast 
Hotel before the plan was made public and concludes that "it was not 
clear that Roberts had actually changed his mind."174 
Another influential legal text which adopts the revised history is 
Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System. 175 
Although the first edition, published in 1954, merely noted the court-
packing plan, 176 the second edition, published eighteen years later, 
cited both Frankfurter's tribute and a 1967 article by Harvard Law 
School Professor Paul Freund as the sources for "the role of Justice 
Roberts in the Parish [sic] case. "177 
B. 
The adoption by many constitutional law casebooks of the revised 
history of Justice Roberts's switch played an even more important role 
than constitutional histories and law review articles in disseminating 
the revised history. Beginning in 1959 and largely continuing today, 
a number of constitutional law casebooks have cited Frankfurter's 
tribute as evidence that Roberts probably was not influenced by the 
court-packing plan. 178 Before then, constitutional law casebooks rou-
174 ld. 
175 PAUL M. BATOR, PAUL J. MISHKIN, DAVID L. SHAPIRO & HERBERT WECHSLER, HART 
AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. I973) . Bator and 
Shapiro both taught at Harvard Law School. Wechsler taught at Columbia University. Mishkin 
moved from the University of Pennsylvania to the University of California at Berkeley after the 
publication of the second edition. 
176 The first edition of the book, published in I954, mentions the court-packing plan at the 
end and quotes, in order, from Hughes's statement of May I9, I934, to the American Law 
Institute; from FDR's February 5, I934, message regarding court reorganization; and from 
Hughes's March 2 I, I 93 7, letter, assent~d to by Brandeis and Van Devanter, to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. See HENRY M . HART, }R. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM I395-I403 (Ist ed. I954). The book was dedicated, "To 
Felix Frankfurter, who first opened our minds to these problems." ld. at ix . 
17 7 BATOR, MISHKIN, SHAPIRO & WECHSLER, supra note I75, at 44 n .6I; see also PAUL M. 
BATOR, DANIEL J. MELTZER, PAUL}. MISHKIN & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S 
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 42 n.6I (3d ed. I988) (citing both the 
Frankfurter and the Freund articles for Roberts's role in West Coast Hotel). According to the 
authors of the second edition, the late Professor Bator was ultimately responsible for Chapter 
I, in which this quotation is found. See BATOR, MISHKIN, SHAPIRO & WECHSLER, supra note 
175, at xvii. Professor Mishkin, one of the authors of the second and third editions, also cited 
Frankfurter's tribute in his I 982 Owen J . Roberts Lecture , and cautioned that his citation of 
Frankfurter was "not to give any credence to the famous supposed 'switch in time' on the 
validity of minimum wage legislation." Paul]. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: R eflections 
on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, I3I U. PA. L. REv. 907 , 
907 n. I (I 983). 
178 See EDWARD L. BARRETT, }R., PAUL W. BRUTON & }OHN HONNOLD, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2IO-II (Ist ed. I959) (hereinafter BARRETT, BRUTON & HONNOLD, 
fiRST EDITION]; NOEL T. DOWLING & GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CON-
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tinely ignored the change in voting by Hughes and Roberts, largely 
because there seemed to be nothing to say in defense of their actions. 
In 1954, four constitutional law casebooks were published. Two 
books, authored by Walter Dodd and Noel Dowling, ignored the 
court-packing episode altogether, 179 while a third, edited by Paul 
Kauper, only briefly mentioned the proposed court reorganization 
plan.180 The most extensive coverage given to the constitutional crisis 
of 1937 is a note on FDR's court reorganization plan found in the 
casebook edited by Paul Freund, Arthur Sutherland, Mark DeWolfe 
Howe, and Ernest J. Brown, all professors at Harvard Law School. 18 1 
STITUTIONAL LAW 265-69, 878 n. I (7th ed. I965) [hereinafter DOWLING & GUNTHER, SEVENTH 
EDITION]; 2 PAUL A. FREUND, ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, MARK D. W. HOWE & ERNEST J. 
BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS I630 (Ist ed. I954); }OHN E. 
NOWAK, RONALD D . ROTUNDA & J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39 n . I6 (Ist ed. 
I978) (omitting the cite to Frankfurter but nevertheless concluding "Uustice] Roberts' switch 
thus represented an actual change in conviction and not merely a shift with the political winds 
caused by announcement of the court-packing plan," and citing ALFRED H . KELLY & WINFRED 
A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 764 (4th ed. 
I970) [hereinafter KELLY & HARBISON, FOURTH EDITION], in which Kelly and Harbison re-
versed their view of Justice Roberts's votes, and called them "principled"); ]OHN E. NowAK, 
RONALD J. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.6, at 35 n .I6 (3d ed. 
I986) (making the same argument but adding as support a citation to Justice Frankfurter's 
tribute); LAURENCE H . TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-6, at 449 & n. I8 (Ist ed. 
I978) (omitting cite to Frankfurter's tribute, but citing Arthur Sutherland's Constitutionalism in 
America, which itself cites the tribute , see SUTHERLAND, supra note I67, at 496-97). One 
casebook cited the Frankfurter tribute but used it much more cautiously. See PAUL BREST & 
SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 302 ·(2d ed. I983) ("Although there are indications that [Roberts] cast his sustaining vote ·in 
the later case [West Coast Hotel] before Roosevelt presented Congress with the court-packing 
bill , the received notion is that Roberts' fear of the bill caused him to make 'the switch in time 
that saved nine.' Whatever Roberts' motivation, Roosevelt's court-packing plan ultimately 
failed." (footnote omitted)). 
Several casebooks only briefly mention the court-packing plan, often with a summary con-
clusion. See WILLIAM B . LOCKHART, YALE KAMISAR & }ESSE H . CHOPER, THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION: CASES AND MATERIALS I57-58 (Ist ed. I964) (quoting Robert L. Stern, The 
Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1939-1946, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645, 68I-82 (I946)). 
Compare }EROME A. BARRON & C . THOMAS DIENES , CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY I89 (Ist ed. I975l (briefly mentioning the court·packing plan and stating that "[u]nder 
the threat of court-packing, however, the court recanted") with JEROME A. BARRON, C. THOMAS 
DIENES, WAYNE McCORMACK & MARTIN H . REDISH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY 96 (4th ed. I992) ("Whether for its own reasons or under the threat of court-packing, 
the Court recanted."). See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M . SEIDMAN, CASS .R. 
SUNSTEIN & MARK V. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I68 (Ist ed. I986) ("Whether or not 
Uustice Roberts 's] behavior made sense to him, his position was widely characterized as ' the 
switch in time that saved Nine."'). 
119 See WALTER F. DODD, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. I954); NOEL T. 
DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. I954); FREUND, SUTHERLAND, HOWE & 
BROWN, supra note I78; PAUL G. KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(Ist ed. I954) . 
180 See KAUPER, supra note I79, at III-I2. 
181 See I FREUND, SuTHERLAND, HowE & BROWN, supra note I78 , at 24I-44. 
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What is most curious about this note, however, is what it does not 
say. In their synopsis of FDR's court reorganization plan, the authors 
managed entirely to avoid discussing the switch by Justice Roberts. 182 
In 1959, the first constitutional law casebook to cite Frankfurter's 
tribute - perhaps also "the first truly modern postwar constitutional 
law casebook"183 - was Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Paul W. Bruton, 
and John Honnold's Constitutional Law. 184 Discussing FDR's plan , 
the authors cited Frankfurter's tribute for the proposition that Roberts 
had not switched his vote. 185 The authors carefully withheld judg-
ment of the strength of the evidence, although they noted that the 
"memorandum does not deal with the relationship between the Carter 
case . . . and the Jones & Laughlin case."186 Two years later, Freund 
and his co-authors added to their discussion of substantive due process 
a note citing Justice Frankfurter's tribute. 187 The authors commented, 
"Mr. Justice Roberts prepared a contemporaneous memorandum con-
cerning his 'vote' in the Parrish case. "188 Frankfurter's tribute states 
that Roberts's memorandum was prepared in 1945, not contempora-
neously. 189 
The most influential constitutional law casebook to utilize Frank-
furter's tribute has been Professor Gerald Gunther's Constitutional 
Law. 190 After becoming co-author of the Dowling casebook beginning 
with the seventh edition, Gunther not only cited the Frankfurter 
tribute, but he also seemed to accept the proposition that, at least 
with respect to the decision in West Coast Hotel, Justice Roberts had 
!82 See id. 
183 William Cohen, Preface to the Eighth Edition of EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR. , WILLIAM 
COHEN & }ONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS at xxiv (8th 
ed. 1989) (referring to BARRETT, BRUTON & HONNOLD, FIRST EDITION, supra note I78) . 
184 See BARRETT, BRUTON & HONNOLD, FIRST EDITION, supra note I78, at 2 I r. 
185 See id. at 2 IO-I r. 
186 I d. at 2 I r. Subsequent editions of the casebook left unchanged this brief analysis of the 
effect of the court-packing plan on Roberts's votes. See, e.g., EDWARD L . BARRETT, JR. , 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 225 n. I (5th ed. I977); EDWARD L. BARRETT, 
JR. & WILLIAM COHEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 200 n .I (7th ed. I985); 
BARRETT, COHEN & VARAT, supra note I83, at 22I n.I; WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. 
VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 204 n.I (9th ed. I993). But see NOEL 
T. DOWLING, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 287 n .2 (6th ed. I959) ("Whatever its bearing 
on the course of decisions or the fortune of the Court, it is a fact that in the period after Alton 
and Schechter and before Jones & Laughlin . . . , President Franklin D. Roosevelt submitted 
to Congress, February I937, a proposal for the reorganization of the federal courts."); RAY 
FORRESTER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 783 (Ist ed. I959) (defending Justice 
Roberts on the ground that "the conference vote by the Court on the case was taken in January, 
I937 [sic], before the court plan was known"). 
187 See 2 PAUL A. FREUND, ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, MARK D.W. HOWE & ERNEST J. 
BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS I327 (2d ed. I96I). 
188Jd. 
189 See Frankfurter, supra note Io, at 3I4 n . * 
190 GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. I975). 
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not switched his vote in response to FDR's Court packing.191 Dis-
cussing the effect of the court-packing plan on the Court's interpre-
tation of the Commerce Clause, Gunther wrote: 
West Coast Hotel, in particular, provoked the charge that Justice 
Roberts had changed his position in the face of the Roosevelt challenge 
- the 'switch in time' that supposedly 'saved the Nine.' But, as a 
memorandum left by the Justice demonstrates, the Court voted in 
West Coast Hotel weeks before the judicial reorganization plan was 
announced. 192 
He then cited Justice Frankfurter's tribute. 193 Also found in the 
seventh edition was a footnote added by Gunther to the primary case 
of West Coast Hotel. This footnote was appended to the sentence in 
Chief Justice Hughes's opinion, which stated that Morehead was de-
cided as it was because New York counsel asked the Court only to 
distinguish, not to reconsider Adkins, 194 and directed the reader to 
Justice Roberts's memorandum regarding why he voted with the ma-
jority in both Morehead and West Coast Hotel. 195 Although Professor 
Gunther cautioned the reader to compare Justice Roberts's pre- and 
post-1937 commerce clause and taxing power votes, the attention 
given to Justice Roberts's behavior concerning the minimum wage 
cases suggests an acceptance of Frankfurter's revisionist history. 196 
Beginning in the ninth edition and continuing to the present edition 
with only minor changes, Professor Gunther's casebook has read: 
It is nevertheless clear that constitutional doctrine changed signifi-
cantly during this period. But arguing that the shift was a response 
to the Court-Packing Plan is easiest with respect to national powers 
doctrines; with respect to due process, West Coast Hotel is certainly 
of a deferential piece with the pre-Court-packing decision in 1934 
(written by Justice Roberts) in the Nebbia case.I97 
19 1 See DOWLING & GUNTHER, SEVENTH EDITION, supra note 178, at 268, 878 n .r. Al-
though Professor Dowling remained the lead author of the casebook , the seventh edition was 
edited by Professor Gunther. See Gerald Gunther, Preface to DOWLING & GUNTHER, SEVENTH 
EDITION, supra note 178, at xi-xii. 
192 DOWLING & GUNTHER, SEVENTH EDITION, supra note 178, at 268. 
19J See id. 
194 See id. at 878. 
195 See id. at 878 n . r. 
196 See id. 
19 7 GUNTHER, TWELFTH EDITION, supra note rr, at 457; GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 467 (rrth ed. 1985); GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 534 (roth ed. 
198o); GUNTHER, supra note 190, at 583. Professor Gunther's approach to the "switch in time" 
through the twelfth edition of his casebook has remained largely the same . As if to emphasize 
the view that it is Nebbia, not West Coast Hotel , that marks a turn in the Court's economic 
substantive due process jurisprudence, Nebbia remains a primary case throughout the editions; 
in contrast, West Coast Hotel has been relegated to the notes following Nebbia. After the rrth 
edition, West Coast Hotel was changed from a primary to a note case, and Gunther's reiteration 
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All three of Justice Frankfurter's defenses - timing, Nebbia, and 
Justice Roberts's memorandum - were thus accepted by Professor 
Gunther, whose casebook has been the most widely used constitutional 
law casebook for much of the last twenty-five years. 198 With the near 
universal adoption of Frankfurter's position in casebooks, the revised 
history of Roberts's "switch" was secured. 
C. 
In 1967, the eminent constitutional law scholar Paul Freund199 
twice cited the tribute of his mentor Felix Frankfurter while discussing 
Justice Roberts's switch. In evaluating the contributions of Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Freund wholly adopted the claim that 
Justice Roberts switched his position in West Coast Hotel before the 
Court Plan was announced. 200 From Freund's perspective, "[t]his is 
entirely in keeping with Roberts's character, which led him to react 
violently against what he thought was intellectual slipperiness and 
sometimes to decide cases on a seemingly impressionistic, ad hoc 
basis. "20 1 The other citation is found in the third edition of the 
constitutional law casebook co-authored by Freund. The book re-
tained the mention of Justice Roberts's voting change in West Coast 
Hotel, as well as the erroneous statement that the memorandum was 
prepared contemporaneously with his decision in West Coast Hotel. 202 
Over twenty years later, Freund again cited Justice Frankfurter's 
of Justice Roberts's votes was made part of the note following West Coast Hotel, rather than a 
footnote added by him to the case. See GUNTHER, TWELFTH EDITION, supra note II , at r22-
24, 455-57 . Other casebooks have also placed Nebbia and West Coast Hotel together. See, 
e.g., 2 PAUL A. FREUND, ARTHUR E . SUTHERLAND, MARK D .W. HOWE & ERNEST]. BROWN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS 1621-30 (3d ed. r967) (placing Nebbia 
and West Coast Hotel as back-to-hack primary cases); WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, YALE KAMISAR 
& }ESSE H . CHOPER, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: CASES AND MATERIALS 332-35 (2d ed. 
1967) (placing West Coast Hotel as a note case immediately following primary case of Nebbia); 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 375-78 (rst ed. 
1981) (placing West Coast Hotel as a note case immediately following primary case of Nebbia). 
198 See Letter from Charles Taibi , Foundation Press, to Michael Ariens, Professor (June 9, 
r993) (on file at the Harvard Law School Library). The following provides a sampling of the 
number of adoptions of Professor Gunther's Constitutional Law casebook: 9th edition (r977), 
II 3 adoptions; roth edition (r982), 135 adoptions; IIth edition (r987), r25 adoptions; and 12th 
edition (r992), ro9 adoptions. Foundation Press has no record of the number of adoptions of 
the 7th or 8th editions of the casebook, and it has a policy of not publicly releasing the total 
sales of a book. See id. The highest number of adoptions of Professor Gunther's book was r47 
in r98o, the first year of the roth edition. Telephone Interview with Charles Taibi , Foundation 
Press (June 9, r993). 
199 See generally Paul A. Freund, HARV. L. BULL., June r992 , at r6 (describing Freund's 
accomplishments). 
200 See Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 8r HARV. L. REv. 4, 29-
30 (r967). 
201 I d. at 30. 
202 See 2 FREUND, SUTHERLAND, HOWE & BROWN, supra note r97, at r630. 
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tribute as authority, 203 although he was less certain that Justice Rob-
erts and Chief Justice Hughes had not changed their votes as a result 
of FDR's court reorganization plan. 204 
Freund also played a central role in planting Justice Frankfurter's 
revised history in another text: Thomas Reed Powell's Vagaries and 
Varieties in Constitutional Interpretation. 205 Vagaries and Varieties 
was based on the Carpentier lectures given by Powell at Columbia 
Law School in April and May of 1955, and was intended to be a 
summing up of Professor Powell's work in teaching and writing about 
constitutional law. 
While discussing Roberts's change of mind, Powell stated: "Uustice 
Roberts] saw a somewhat flickering white light on the road to Da-
mascus after the election of 1936 and before the proposal of the so-
called Court Plan of 1937."206 After "1936" in the text, a lengthy 
footnote was appended that attempted to explain Justice Roberts's 
decisionmaking processes. 207 The footnote concludes: "Thus Mr. Jus-
tice Roberts's position in the two cases [Morehead and West Coast 
Hotel] can be harmonized as the view of one who was unable to 
distinguish the Adkins case but who would accept an opportunity to 
overrule it. "208 Powell, a professor of constitutional law at Harvard 
Law School from 1925 to 1949, trained in both political science and 
law, was a master at dissecting Supreme Court opinions and exposing 
biases hidden within judicial decisions. 209 Coming from the skeptical 
203 See Paul A. Freund , The Rise and Fall of Judicial Resistance to the New Deal: Bench-
marks from the Federal Courts for Massachusetts, 74 MAss. L. REv. 234, 238 (I989). 
204 See id. Freund wrote: "Was the seeming turnabout, involving especially Hughes and 
Roberts , due to the President's 'Court-packing' plan? The question is probably unanswerable, 
even by the subjects of the inquiry, given the subtle, atmospheric, imperceptible elements that 
play upon one's mind and judgment." I d. Freund's statement may have been his considered 
judgment after decades of study, or may have been simply a dramatic rendering in a short 
article discussing the Massachusetts connection to New Deal cases. 
205 See THOMAS REED POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRE-
TATION (I956). 
206 I d. at 81 (footnote omitted). 
207 See id. at 8I n.89. 
208 /d . 
209 See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, I927-I960, at 50-5I (I986). One of 
Powell's quips skewered both the Supreme Court and the Restatement of the Law project of 
the American Law Institute. In his mock Restatement of Constitutional Law, Powell suggested 
that the Court's decisions in dormant commerce clause cases should be restated to the effect 
that the black letter law is that Congress may regulate commerce, the states may regulate 
commerce some, but not too much; and the comment to the black letter law should state, "how 
much is too much is beyond the scope of [t]his Restatement. " GUNTHER, TWELFTH EDITION, 
supra note II , at 254 n.r. For memorial tributes to Powell, see Erwin N. Griswold, Felix 
Frankfurter, Paul A. Freund & Henry M. Hart, Jr., Thomas Reed Powell, 69 HARV. L. REv. 
793, 793-805 (I956). See also Paul A. Freund, Powell, Thomas Reed, in DICTIONARY OF 
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY I95 I-1955, at 549, 549 (John A. Garraty ed. , Supp. V I977) (noting 
that Powell would often "expose [the] lack of candor, question-begging, and logical lacunae" 
behind judicial opinions). 
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and critical mind of T. R. Powell, this statement gives an authority to 
the revised history and forces one to consider the possibility that the 
revised history is the accurate history. 
Professor Powell, however, never wrote this footnote. Powell died 
on August 16, 1955, shortly after giving the Carpentier lectures. The 
task of editing these lectures into book form fell largely to Freund, 
who stated that the "principal task has been to document the text by 
furnishing the footnote references, occasionally with some explana-
tion. "210 Thus, this footnote, which mouths the explanation given by 
Justice Frankfurter, both in the tribute and in a 1953 letter to Freund, 
came not from Powell, but from Freund. 211 Consequently, giving 
credence to the footnote forces one to decide whether to believe 
Freund's, and thus Justice Frankfurter's, interpretation of Justice Rob-
erts's voting behavior. It is not Powell's conclusion, and it is not an 
independent assessment of the validity of the revised history, as some 
have used it. 212 
Freund was also Justice Frankfurter's handpicked author of the 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the 
United States for the 1930-41 era, the years during which Hughes 
210 Paul A. Freund, Foreword to POWELL, supra note 205, at x. Columbia Law School 
Dean William Warren, in his preface to Powell's book, wrote that "Professor Freund is very 
modest when he describes his work and that of his colleague [Ernest J. Brown] as 'furnishing 
the footnote references, occasionally with some explanation.'" William C. Warren, Preface to 
POWELL, supra note 205, at xv. 
211 See Frankfurter, supra note ro , at 314; Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Paul A. 
Freund, Professor, Harvard Law School (Oct. 8, 1953), microformed on Harvard Frankfurter 
Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel rs. Freund stated that "[a]fter the lectures were delivered 
Professor Powell made some slight revisions in all of them. He marked the text with footnote 
signs but did not supply the footnotes themselves." Paul A. Freund, Foreword to PowELL, 
supra note 205, at x. This may indicate that Powell himself wanted to insert the material that 
Freund provided in footnote 89 but was unable to do so due to his untimely death. Freund 
later indicates, however, that "[a]t a very few points in the manuscript we took occasion to 
correct a slip of memory or clarify an ambiguity that would not have survived the author's 
further scrutiny." I d. Freund does not state at which points in the text such ambiguities or 
slips of memory occurred. 
Further, the correspondence between Justice Frankfurter and Powell located in both sets of 
papers contains no indications that the two ever discussed Justice Roberts's actions during the 
spring of 1937 . See Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78; Thomas Reed Powell Papers, 
Harvard Law School Library. 
Although there may be an issue concerning timing, given that Vagaries and Varieties was 
published only a few months after the tribute , a Jetter from Justice Frankfurter reveals that 
Freund was given an advance peek at the Frankfurter revisionist history in a letter to him from 
Frankfurter sent in October 1953. See supra note 78. The October 1953 letter models the 
explanation or "synthesis" undertaken in footnote 89 to Powell's Vagaries and Varieties. Freund 
thus had ample time and opportunity to formulate the argument made in footnote 89 of Vagaries 
and Varieties . However, because Powell gave his lectures in April and May of 1955, and died 
on August r6 , 1955 , it would have been impolitic for the footnote to cite to Frankfurter's future 
tribute. 
212 See, e.g., CuRRIE, supra note 173, at 236 n. r62. 
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was Chief Justice. Although Freund never completed this history, 213 
the tentative title -Depression, New Deal and the Court in Crisis, 
1930-41 - suggests that he intended to devote considerable attention 
to the crucial event of this period, the I 93 7 crisis and Roberts's "switch 
in time." The correspondence between Freund and Frankfurter214 
illustrates Frankfurter's deep and abiding interest in making the re-
vised history the official history. 
D. 
Some political scientists of the post-World War II generation were 
more skeptical of the revised history than were their counterparts in 
law schools. 21 5 In part, this was because political scientists viewed 
213 For a critical attack on Freund's editorial directorship of the Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Devise history, see Sanford Levinson, Book Review, 75 VA. L. REv. 1429, 1429 n.2 (1989) 
(reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35 
(1988)). Justice Frankfurter's attempt to influence the entire Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise 
History of the Supreme Court, including the history of the crisis of 1937, is well documented 
in several of his letters to Freund. See Letters from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Paul A. Freund, 
Professor, Harvard Law School (Jan. 18, 1963; Sept. 24, 1963; June 13, 1964 [Library of 
Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, indicate that this letter was dated June 3, 1964]; 
July r, 1964), microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 38. 
214 See Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78. Freund's papers are presently being 
catalogued at the Harvard Law School Library and are not yet available for review. However, 
Professor Richard Friedman of the University of Michigan Law School possesses Freund's papers 
relating to the history of the Hughes Court. 
21 5 Chief among the skeptics was Alpheus T . Mason, whose many published books and 
articles followed the original history of Roberts's actions and largely ignored Frankfurter's 
tribute. Although Mason was aware of the tribute, he only mentioned it briefly in his essay on 
Roberts in the Dictionary of American Biography. See Alpheus T. Mason, Roberts, Owen 
Josephus , in DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 1951-1955, supra note 209, at 571 , 574· 
It is a curious essay. To some extent, Mason accepts the revisionist history that Roberts did 
not retreat in West Coast Hotel because New York counsel in Morehead asked only to distinguish 
Adkins. Mason also, however, criticizes Frankfurter's tribute to Roberts , although for whatever 
reason, Mason's essay does not mention the memorandum itself. See id. Mason also suggests 
at one point that Roberts was simple-minded and did not switch as a result of the 1936 election. 
Later in the essay, though, he calls the change of mind by "Hughes-Roberts" a "switch." See 
id . 
Frankfurter and Mason were not friends. Their relationship may have been colored by 
Mason's view of the politics of judging, and in particular, by his caustic view of Hughes. See 
J. Woodford Howard, Jr. , Alpheus T. Mason and the Art of Judicial Biography, 8 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 41 , 48-49 (1991) (noting that "Mason's dislike of Hughes was a standing joke 
among his graduate students of my generation"). In Mason's ey.:s, Hughes was the villain of 
the constitutional crisis of r 93 7 - in large part because he was a conservative who wanted to 
be perceived as a liberal and because, in Mason's rendering, he manipulated the law to make 
it conform to his subjective preferences. Frankfurter, in turn , regularly denounced both Mason 
and his work. See Letters from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Paul A. Freund, Professor, Harvard 
Law School (July r, 1964; Feb. 20, 1956; Oct. 24, 1955; undated [October 22-23 , 1950]); Note 
from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Paul A. Freund, Professor, Harvard Law School (undated 
[approx. April 1956]); Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Arthur W. Cowan, Esq ., (Oct. 24, 1958), 
microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 38. Professor 
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the Court as a political institution and generally were less concerned 
about maintaining the viability of the law/politics split. 216 Despite the 
different lens through which political scientists viewed the Court, 
however, this skepticism often vanished after they evaluated Frank-
furter's tribute and the Roberts memorandum. For example, in 1962, 
Walter Murphy cited Frankfurter's tribute for the proposition that 
Roberts had not switched his vote in West Coast Hotel as a result of 
Roosevelt's court-packing plan. Murphy reached this conclusion even 
though he noted that some court plan was expected even before it 
was announced in February 1937, and in spite of Justice Roberts's 
testimony in 1954 that the Court was under tremendous strain during 
the crisis. 21 7 Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison were also 
deeply affected by the revised history. 21 8 In the third edition of their 
Melvin Urofsky states that he was told by Pearl von Allman, the University of Louisville's late 
law librarian, that Frankfurter retrieved his letters to Brandeis from the Brandeis collection at 
the University of Louisville "because he did not want Alpheus Mason (then working on a 
Brandeis biography) to see them." MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL 
RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 219 (1991); see also Clyde Spillenger, Reading the 
Judicial Canon: Alexander Bickel and the Book of Brandeis, 79 J. AM . HIST. 125, 131 (1992) 
(noting that "Frankfurter, whose distaste for Alpheus Mason's writings on Brandeis led him to 
obstruct Mason's research efforts, [also] encouraged Bickel and Freund to take up Brandeis as 
a subject"). 
21 6 Two excellent examples of the perspective of political scientists in the post-World War II 
era regarding the political nature of the Supreme Court are found in the 1965 Rosenthal Lecture 
given by political scientist William M. Beaney and in Mason's and Heaney's textbook. 
If political science is the study of how the "political system" makes "authoritative allo-
cations of value" in any society, it follows that no apology is needed for a continuing 
concern with the American Supreme Court, which, more than other courts in the Anglo-
American or the Civil Law system, has from the beginning made, and is expected to 
make, many of the crucial allocations of values in our society. It is , then, in Professor 
Rosenblum's felicitous phrase, "a political instrument," and should be judged in that 
light. 
William M. Beaney, The Supreme Court: The Perspective of Political Science, in MAx FREED-
MAN, WILLIAM M. BEANEY & EUGENE V. ROSTOW, PERSPECTIVES ON THE COURT 34-35 (1967) 
(footnotes omitted). In their casebook Mason and Beaney argue that 
The Supreme Court has always consisted largely of politicians, appointed by politicians, 
confirmed by politicians, all in furtherance of controversial political objectives. From 
John Marshall to Warren Burger, the Court has been the guardian of some particular 
interest and the promoter of preferred values. 
ALPHEUS T. MASON & WILLIAM M. BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at xiii (6th 
ed. 1978). 
217 See MURPHY, supra note 18, at 59-60 n.*; see also ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER, 
supra note 9, at 392-93 ("The accusation about 'Roberts' Switch' arose from his conduct in two 
cases, conduct that was gravely misunderstood not only by the public but by the legal profes-
sion."). 
218 Compare ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: 
ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 759-60 (3d ed. 1963) [hereinafter KELLY & HARBISON, THIRD 
EDITION] (arguing that Justice Roberts was aware of the political implications of his change of 
heart, but that he did not necessarily act "merely to defeat the court plan") with KELLY & 
HARBISON, FOURTH EDITION, supra note 178, at 764 (decrying as "simple" any interpretation 
of Justice Roberts's switch that ignored the new evidence of his principled change in conviction). 
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history of the American Constitution, published in 1963, they had 
concluded that the reversal of Hughes and Roberts was "shrewdly 
calculated"219 and that it was "scarcely conceivable" that the two 
Justices "were unaware of the political implications of their move. "220 
In the fourth edition of their book, published in 1970, the authors 
reversed their opinion, relying on evidence initially provided by 
Frankfurter: "In short, Roberts' dramatic shift on minimum wage 
legislation reflected principled conviction on his part and not mere 
political opportunism. "221 
After Frankfurter's tribute, the most thorough attempt to return 
to the original case that Justice Roberts "switched" is John Chambers's 
article, The Big Switch: Justice Roberts and the Minimum-Wage 
Cases. 222 Professor Chambers drew two conclusions: first, that "a 
combination of pressures- presidential, congressional, and most im-
portant, public - convinced Roberts that he must accept the new 
philosophy and interpret the Constitution in line with the times;"223 
and second, that Roberts's "memorandum is both ambiguous and 
contrived. "224 The first conclusion modified the initial interpretation, 
for Chambers relied on evidence of public unrest more than FDR's 
court-packing threat. 22 5 Although I agree with Chambers's second 
conclusion, it deflects us from a fuller understanding of the memoran-
dum's purpose. Chambers was convinced that Roberts wrote it to 
enhance his reputation posthumously; I am convinced, however, that 
Frankfurter published the memorandum less to defend Roberts and 
more to reassert the Supreme Court's independence from politics and 
thereby enhance the Court's reputation . Roberts was a foil, a maguffin 
whom Frankfurter used for the Court's benefit. The memorandum 
was "ambiguous and contrived," but for reasons that have little to do 
with Roberts. 
219 KELLY & HARBISON, THIRD EDITION, supra note 218, at 759· 
220 /d . 
221 KELLY & HARBISON, FOURTH EDITION, supra note 178, at 764; see also GLENDON A. 
SCHUBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF SUPREME COURT }US-
TICES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES THAT THEY MAKE 168 (1969) (suggesting that a 
quantitative analysis of the Court's decisions indicated "that both Hughes and Roberts switched 
in the term of the Court-packing fight, " but tempering the conclusion by stating that the Roberts 
memorandum was "a powerful rebuttal" to his quantitative analysis). 
222 See Chambers, supra note 146, at 45 passim. 
223 /d . at 73; see also ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 175 (1960) 
(concluding that some combination of FDR's reelection victory, labor unrest, and the court-
packing plan led to Roberts's turnabout) . 
224 Chambers, supra note 146, at 67. 
225 Edward Corwin also made the argument that Hughes and Roberts were affected by labor 
unrest when they changed their votes. See CORWIN, supra note 70, at 73· Robert McCloskey 
suggested the same of Roberts. See McCLOSKEY, supra note 223, at 175; see also LEO PFEFFER, 
THIS HoNORABLE COURT 320 (1965) ("It is of little moment whether the switch in time that 
saved nine was made in December of 1936 or February of 1937 . In either case, its explanation 
lies in political rather than judicial terms."). 
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E. 
The final path by which the revised history took hold was through 
Frankfurter's biographers. 226 For them, the most difficult question to 
answer, in order to evaluate the court-packing episode, was whether 
Frankfurter's private correspondence in the spring of 1937 could be 
reconciled with his public defense of Roberts nearly a generation 
later. 227 
Max Freedman, Frankfurter's hand-picked biographer228 and the 
person who first made public Frankfurter's letter to FDR, gave the 
initial and still generally accepted explanation. Freedman explained 
that Frankfurter "deeply regretted this letter, "229 and that one purpose 
of Frankfurter's tribute to Roberts was to "correct[] this mistake. "230 
226 Evaluating the impact of the court-packing plan and the "switch in time" was also 
important to Franklin Roosevelt's biographers. In I94I, FDR claimed that he lost the battle 
but won the war by waging his fight to reorganize the judiciary. See 6 PuBLIC PAPERS: THE 
CONSTITUTION PREVAILS, supra note I2, at lxvi-lxx. But the fourth and most recent volume 
of Kenneth Davis's biography of FDR, after delving deeply into the crisis of I937, comes to a 
much different conclusion. Using the Roberts memorandum for support, although critical of 
Roberts's "disingenuous" claims, Davis writes: "Roosevelt's court message had no such causal 
efficacy as he later claimed for it." DAVIS, supra note II , at 99· Given this view, Davis 
concludes more broadly: 
[Roosevelt's] sadly mistaken court-packing effort effectively ended the New Deal as a 
reforming, transforming social force - effectively destroyed the possibility that the New 
Deal could achieve those "practical controls over blind economic forces and blindly selfish 
men, " could "create those moral controls over the services of science . . . necessary to 
make science a useful servant instead of a ruthless master of mankind," that Roosevelt 
had named in his second inaugural as fundamental objectives of his administration. 
Id . at 99-Ioo. 
227 A related question Frankfurter's biographers have wrestled with is whether Frankfurter, 
who refused to state publicly his views on FDR's court-packing plan, supported the plan. 
Although Frankfurter's critics argue that he privately detested the court-packing plan but refused 
to denounce FDR publicly because he desired a seat on the Supreme Court, see, e.g., DOUGLAS, 
supra note I69, at 324, the consensus is that, although Frankfurter disapproved of the plan, he 
was willing to forgo publicly voicing his disapproval in order to remain loyal to President 
Roosevelt. Compare BAKER, supra note I68, at 326-28 (concluding that Frankfurter privately 
opposed the plan but remained silent to support FDR); BAKER, supra note SI, at I86-87 (same); 
NELSON L. DAWSON, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND THE NEW DEAL I42 
(I98o) (same); Joseph P. Lash, A Brahmin of the Law, in LASH, supra note 84, at 59 (same); 
and HELEN SHIRLEY THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 3I (I960) 
(same) with PARRISH, supra note 54, at 269 (concluding that Frankfurter believed the greater 
evil was the Court, not FDR's plan); and UROFSKY, supra note 215, at 44 (same). Frankfurter 
refused a request from a doctoral candidate in history to state publicly his views regarding the 
court-packing plan IS years after the fact. See Letter from E. Kimbark MacColl to Justice 
Felix Frankfurter (Aug. I8, I952), microformed on Library of Congress Frankfurter Papers, 
supra note 78, at Container I8I (including handwritten note from Frankfurter indicating refusal 
to state publicly his opinion). 
228 See Max Freedman, Justice Frankfurter and Judicial Review, in FREEDMAN, BEANEY 
& ROSTOW, supra note 2I6, at I, 4· 
229 ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 9, at 392. 
230 /d. On reconciling Frankfurter's earlier and later views, Leonard Baker seemed paralyzed 
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Freedman (or is it Frankfurter?) continued by stating that the accu-
sation of Roberts's switch arose from "conduct gravely misunderstood 
not only by the public but by the legal profession. "231 This explana-
tion thus defused criticism of Roberts's actions by laying blame on 
Frankfurter's mistaken impression in I 93 7. 
Frankfurter biographer and historian Michael Parrish dissents. 
Relying on his own survey of the evidence regarding Roberts's 
switch, 232 Parrish concluded that Frankfurter's privately expressed 
view in 1937 was correct233 and that Frankfurter's tribute was farther 
from the truth . 234 What Parrish did not explain, however, was why 
it was important to Frankfurter for the revisionist history to succeed. 
The opinion that I believe is closest to the truth is expressed by 
Professor H.N. Hirsch in his psychological biography of Frank-
furter. 235 Hirsch notes that Frankfurter wanted history to prove that 
"Roberts had, after all, not really switched his votes during the Court-
packing fight. "236 Hirsch also notes that Frankfurter regularly wrote 
to Paul Freund, "The historian of the Supreme Court,"237 about his 
views of the events of the Hughes Court. This was, as Hirsch states, 
part of Frankfurter's efforts "to leave his legacy by shaping history to 
agree with his interpretation of events. "238 
by Frankfurter's tribute when compared to his evidence, which indicated a flip by Justice 
Roberts. See BAKER, supra note 168, at 177. Professor Urofsky is alone in believing that 
Frankfurter both supported FDR's court-packing plan and that Roberts apparently did not 
"switch." Urofsky did not cite Frankfurter's tribute, but noted that, "[i)n fact, as later evidence 
has shown, Roberts had decided to vote for the measure well before Roosevelt announced his 
plan." UROFSKY, supra note 215 , at 196 n. 50. 
231 ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 9, at 393· This language is suspiciously 
similar to the language used by Frankfurter in his tribute. See supra p. 635. 
232 See Michael E. Parrish, The Hughes Court, the Great Depression, and the Historians, 
40 HISTORIAN 286, 296-<)7 (1978) (concluding that Roberts switched as a result of FDR's 
resounding reelection). 
233 See ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 9, at 392 . 
234 See Parrish, supra note 232, at 296-97 . The purpose of Parrish's Hughes Court article 
was to compare the histories of the New Deal by the "legal realist" scholars, including Corwin, 
Wright, Mason, and McCloskey, with later histories by conservative revisionists, including 
Swindler and Freund, and New Left historians of the 1960s and early 1970s. Although this 
insightful article does a wonderful job of picking apart the histories of those whose desires lead 
them either to protect or to attack the Court, Parrish fails to grasp the importance of this 
revisionist history in the legal thought of reasoned elaboration, and the centrality of Felix 
Frankfurter to the legal thought of reasoned elaboration. 
235 See H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981). 
236 /d. at 199. Hirsch concludes that Frankfurter's tribute was an attempt to resurrect 
Roberts's reputation , but doesn't evaluate the success of Frankfurter's efforts. See id. at 247 
n.97; see also Spillenger, supra note 215, at 131 (noting that "[t]he preservation of Brandeis's 
reputation and the transmission of the Brandeis 'word' [by 1943) became an absorbing concern 
for Frankfurter"). 
23 7 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Paul A. Freund, Professor, Harvard Law School 
(July 16, 1958), microjormed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 15. 
238 HIRSCH, supra note 235, at 198. 
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What Hirsch fails to give us is a reason why Frankfurter would 
have tried to shape history to declare that Roberts had not really 
switched. Frankfurter engaged in this undertaking, in my view, to 
protect the virtue and integrity of the Supreme Court, again under 
attack after the Court decided Brown. 
VI. 
Americans have taken pride in the independence of their judges, and 
the Brown case may well be the leading symbol of judicial indepen-
dence. 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, HOW INDEPENDENT Is THE COURT?239 
A. 
Included in the Felix Frankfurter Papers at the Harvard Law 
School Library is a clipping of a letter to the editor concerning the 
death of Owen Roberts printed in The London Times. The newspaper 
headline above the letter is "Mr. Owen Roberts" and directly under-
neath , "The Rule of Law." The author, "L.C.," wrote in part: "Those 
who knew [Roberts] knew that he resigned because he considered that 
the Ark of the Covenant of the American Constitution - the Supreme 
Court - was being desecrated by considerations of domestic poli-
tics."240 In a 1960 letter to William 0. Douglas, Frankfurter wrote, 
"I expect from [my law clerks] if not my own religious attitude toward 
the Court as an institution at least a goodly portion of reverence for 
its responsibilities in our national life. "24 1 
This religious imagery serves to explain Justice Frankfurter's desire 
to protect the Court. Frankfurter had an absolute faith in the Court. 
As he once wrote, his life "ha[d] been dedicated to the faith in the 
disinterestedness of a tribunal. "242 The Roberts memorandum was a 
239 Cass R. Sunstein, How Independent Is the Court?, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Oct. 22, 1992, 
at 47 · 
240 Mr. Owen Roberts: The Rule of Law, TIMES (London) , May 25, 1955, at 13, microformed 
on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III , Reel 3· I have been unable to 
ascertain the identity of "L.C." There is no indication from my research that Roberts, a religious 
man, ever viewed the Court in such religious terms. Statements in this letter make clear that 
"L.C." possessed an intimate knowledge of both Roberts and the Court. 
241 Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice William 0. Douglas (Mar. 23, 1960), 
microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 1; see also HIRSCH, 
supra note 235, at 187 ("For the fact is that I have for a considerable time been carrying myself 
with the thought that, perhaps, the best service I could render an institution that has semi-
sacred implications for me was to resign and state fully my reasons - including Stone's major 
responsibility for the state of things." (quoting Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Learned 
Hand, Judge , United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (June 27, 1946)). 
242 PARRISH, supra note 54, at 272 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Wy-
zanski (Apr. 13, 1937)). 
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hole card for Frankfurter to play if a decision or set of decisions 
suggested that the Court was enmeshed in the "turbulence of politics" 
as during the years 1935-193 7. 
The law/politics split was central to Frankfurter's vision of the 
American democratic experiment, 243 and that split was pivotal to post-
World War II legal thought. 244 Indeed, this split was central to 
reasoned elaboration in part because one of the lessons legal progres-
sives (and their heirs) drew from Lochner v. New York245 was that 
the members of the Court were duty-bound to avoid injecting their 
subjective political and philosophical values into constitutional law. 
As evidenced by recent Supreme Court decisions, 246 that split remains 
vital in justifying an independent judiciary. For Frankfurter and 
others,24 7 it was not necessary to prove to political scientists that 
243 This is most clearly shown in the infamous case of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 
329 U.S. 459 (1947). The issue was whether, after failing once, it was cruel and unusual 
punishment for the state of Louisiana to try for a second time to kill Willie Francis. The Court 
held that it was not. See id. at 463 . In a concurrence, Frankfurter wrote, "we cannot escape 
acknowledging that [the constitutional issue] involves the application of standards of fairness 
and justice very broadly conceived. They are not the application of merely personal standards 
but the impersonal standards of society which alone judges, as the organs of Law, are empowered 
to enforce." I d. at 4 70 (Frankfurter, ]. , concurring). After deciding that the state could execute 
Francis, Frankfurter worked behind the scenes to prevent Francis's execution. He was not 
successful. For more on Justice Frankfurter's vision of the division between law and politics, 
see Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REv. 217, 227-
32 (1955); Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 
78r, 794 (195 7) (reprinting the First Owen ]. Roberts Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School) (rejecting "the impression that a Justice of the Court is left at large to exercise his 
private wisdom"); Felix Frankfurter, Some Observations on the Nature of the Judicial Process 
of Supreme Court Litigation, 98 PROC. AM. PHIL. Soc'v 233, 238 (1954), reprinted as The 
Process of Judging in the Supreme Court , in THE SUPREME COURT: VIEWS FROM INSIDE 34, 
42-43 (Alan F. Westin ed., 1961) (propounding the view "that [a judge) is there not to impose 
his private views upon society, that he is not to enforce personalized justice"). 
244 I have discussed this intellectual history in the context of the codification of the law of 
evidence. See Michael Ariens, Progress Is Our Only Product: Legal Reform and the Codification 
of Evidence, 17 LAW & Soc'L INQ. 213 , 247-52 (1992). On the realist-process jurisprudence 
difference regarding "constitutionalism," see Herman Belz, Changing Conceptions of Constitu-
tionalism in the Era of World War II and the Cold War, 59 J. AM. HIST. 640 passim (1972). 
For an incisive evaluation of Alexander Bickel, the most prominent constitutional scholar during 
the period of reasoned elaboration, see generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr. , Alexander M. Bickel 
and the Post-Realist Constitution, II HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 521 passim (1976). 
245 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
246 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. r86 , 194 (1986) ("The Court is most vulnerable and 
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or 
no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. That this is so was painfully 
demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive and the Court in the 193o's .. .. ");Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, II2 S. Ct. 2791 , 2812 (1992) (linking Lochner and West Coast Hotel and 
explaining that "facts" required the latter case to announce a new principle and overrule Adkins). 
247 Not coincidentally, legal scholars who joined Frankfurter to defend Roberts's actions, 
from Erwin Griswold to Arthur Sutherland to Paul Freund, were all professors at the Harvard 
Law School and former students or colleagues of Frankfurter there. 
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Roberts (and possibly Hughes) was motivated by concerns of reason 
and judgment, or craft and principle. It was only necessary that 
preeminent legal scholars relay that message to law students and 
lawyers . Publication of the Roberts memorandum created the oppor-
tunity to claim that judgment (law) rather than will (politics) was 
responsible for Roberts's decisions, and allowed that message to be 
sent to legal scholars. 
B. 
When the constitutional revolution came, as we indicated when 
we were talking about Roosevelt's court-packing plan at an earlier 
meeting, the problems for all of us became: How can we defend a 
judicial veto in areas where we thought it helpful in American life -
civil liberties area, personal freedom, First Amendment - and at the 
same time condemn it in the areas where we considered it unhelp-
ful. 248 
After the constitutional cns1s of r 93 7, legal scholars feared the 
intrusion of "politics" in the Court, and this fear led them to look for 
ways to prevent judgment from becoming will. The difficulty was 
that politics could intrude from within, when a Justice voted based 
on his predilections, or without, when, for example, a Justice voted 
based on pressure from the President. 
Frankfurter's explanation of Roberts's actions in 1937 became the 
accepted history not because Frankfurter elucidated "indisputable 
facts," but rather because this history better enabled legal scholars to 
defend the independence of the Court, which Brown had placed in 
some doubt. 249 When Justice Frankfurter found a "lawful" resolution 
to Brown, the happy coincidence of his personal views with the re-
quirements of the Constitution was just that, a happy coincidence. 25° 
248 Silber & Miller, supra note r4, at 924 (quoting Herbert Wechsler) . 
249 Thus, I disagree with Professor Horwitz's conclusion that Brown "produced a sharply 
critical reaction among elite legal thinkers." MORTON J . HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, r870-r96o: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 258 (r992). 
250 Frankfurter's role in Brown is the subject of much dispute. The standard story is set 
forth in Richard Kluger's r975 book, Simple Justice, in which Frankfurter is viewed as an 
active proponent for holding segregated education unconstitutional . See RICHARD KLUGER, 
SIMPLE JUSTICE 599-600 (r975); see also Dennis]. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: 
Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, I948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. r, 36 n.284 (r979) (noting 
commentators' wide variety of views about Frankfurter's position on Brown). Compare Philip 
Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-
rg6o: An Oral History , roo HARV. L. REv. 8r7, 828 (r987) (suggesting, through the use of an 
oral history, that Frankfurter gave the Solicitor General's office information concerning the 
probable votes of other Justices) with Randall Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, roo HARV. 
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For legal scholars sympathetic to the aims of the plaintiffs in Brown, 
the goal was to justify the exercise of the judicial veto as both lawful 
and "helpful." 
The result was that, from 1954 to 1959, Brown was defended by 
legal academics as vitally important to American society and also as 
a legally unexceptional decision. 25 1 Writing in 1954, Harvard Law 
School Professor Albert M. Sacks concluded that Brown "illustrates 
the functioning of the judicial process at its best. "252 The next year, 
Sacks's colleague Robert Braucher, whose Foreword began with the 
caution that "[t]here will be no praise here for 'judicial statesman-
L. REV. I938 (I987) (suggesting that oral history misleads historians about the path up to and 
including Brown). Hutchinson states that, whatever Frankfurter's views, by the Court's Decem-
ber I953 conference, Frankfurter had realized that a majority of the Court planned to hold 
segregated schooling unconstitutional. See Hutchinson, supra, at 39i see also Tushnet & Lezin, 
supra note IS, at 1872-75, 19I8-29 (detailing and criticizing the standard story of Frankfurter's 
role in Brown). Professor Tushnet's interpretation is that Frankfurter's dilemma in Brown was 
to find a "legal" rather than a "political" solution. See id. at I9I9-20. In commenting on the 
Court's I953 deliberations in Brown, Professor Tushnet writes: 
Frankfurter, seeking a judicial rather than a political resolution to the question, looked 
for support in judicial precedent and custom, but could not find it there . His resources 
as a lawyer were exhausted without turning up a legal justification for what he agreed 
was a 'congenial' political solution. As a result, when the discussion reached the merits 
of Brown, Frankfurter was essentially paralyzed; there was nothing he could say that 
simultaneously satisfied his desire to overturn segregation and his insistence that the 
Court must act judicially rather than politically. 
/d. Professor Tushnet concludes that once Frankfurter was able to view the remedy in Brown 
as legal rather than political, his doubts were resolved. See id. at I92o. I am convinced by 
Tushnet's interpretation of Frankfurter's role in Brown, and I believe that it suggests a reason 
why Frankfurter's revisionist history of the crisis of 1937 was important in defending Brown. 
251 See Robert Braucher, The Supreme Court, 1954 Term- Foreword, 69 HAR.v. L. REv. 
I2o, I20-23 (I95S)i Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N .Y.U. L. REv. ISO, ISO (I9SS)i George 
L. DeLacy, Segregation Cases: A Judicial Problem Judicially Solved, 43 A.B.A. ] . 5I9, S20-
2I (I957)i Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court, 1955 Term - Foreword: Attack on the 
Segregation Cases, 70 HAR.v. L. REv. 83, 85-92 (I9S6); Paul A. Freund, Storm Over the 
American Supreme Court, 2I Moo. L. REv. 345, 350-SI (I958); Paul A. Freund, The Supreme 
Court Crisis , 3I N.Y. ST. B. BULL. 66, 66-70 (I959) [hereinafter Freund, Supreme Court 
Crisis]; Paul G. Kauper, Segregation in Public Education: The Decline of Plessy v. Ferguson, 
52 MICH. L. REv. 1137, 1155-56 (I954)i Robert B. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed": 
Legislative Reaction and Judicial Development, 1956-57, 3I N.Y.U. L. REv. 99I, I078 (I956); 
Albert M. Sacks, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term - Foreword, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 96, 96-99 
(I954)i see also Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 
69 HARV. L. REv. I, I (I9S5) (stating that "the record of history" invited the Brown decision); 
cf. Elias Clark, Charitable Trusts, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 
66 YALE L.J. 979, 98I (I9S7) ("In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court, speaking the 
conscience of a majority of the nation, took a giant step in the evolution of full equality for the 
Negroes. "). Of course, reaction in the south was much more critical. See, e.g., C.K. Brown, 
White South is a Minority Group: Supreme Court Cannot Bestow White Man's Inheritance on 
Another Race, I7 ALA. LAw. 438 , 439-40 (I956); Herman E . Talmadge, School Systems, 
Segregation and the Supreme Court, 6 MERCER L. REv. I89, I90 (I9S5). 
252 Sacks, supra note 25I, at 96. 
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ship,"' because the phrase often was used "to praise unstated and even 
unjudicial reasons for decision,"253 offered the opinion that "even as 
a matter of hindsight it is hard to suggest how the Court could have 
decided [the remedy in Brown] better except perhaps by deciding 
sooner. "254 Professor Edmond Cahn suggested that Brown "spared 
the nation a genuine constitutional crisis, and that in this exigency 
the institution of judicial review rendered an invaluable service. "255 
If Brown was lawful, then it was authoritative, and thus required 
obedience by state officials . The first civil rights act of the twentieth 
century would not be passed until 195 7, and the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, which named and explicitly adopted Brown, was a decade away. 
Although Eisenhower ordered the District of Columbia to desegregate 
its schools in advance of specific court orders, 256 he was conspicuously 
silent about Brown. Only a few months after the Court issued the 
remedy in Brown requiring those public schools to desegregate "with 
all deliberate speed," the nation learned about the acquittal of men in 
Mississippi who had lynched a fourteen-year-old boy from Chicago 
named Emmett Till,257 In December 1955, Rosa Parks would make 
history for refusing to move to the back of the bus. 258 In early 1956, 
southern officials first coined the phrase "massive resistance" to 
the Brown mandate, 259 and from 1957 to 1959, the nation watched 
mobs in Little Rock, Arkansas, react violently to court-ordered de-
segregation of Central High. The crisis Professor Cahn believed the 
Court had spared the nation had arrived. 
Writing to a colleague about the continuing crisis in Little Rock, 
Arkansas, Frankfurter commented that obedience to Brown would be 
based on "the transcending issue of the Supreme Court as the author-
itative organ of what the Constitution requires. "260 When southern 
253 Braucher, supra note 25 I, at I20. 
254 /d . at I23. 
255 Cahn, supra note 25I, at I57-
256 See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS I954-63, 
at rr3 (I988). 
25 7 See JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, I954-65 , 
at 37-57 (I987). This is the companion book to the magnificent documentary of the same name. 
258 See id. at 59-89; BRANCH, supra note 256, at I28-205. 
259 See NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE III (I969) (attributing the 
origin of the phrase to Virginia Senator Harry Byrd); FRANCIS M. WILHOIT, THE POLITICS OF 
MASSIVE RESISTANCE 55 (I973) (same). 
260 TONY FREYER, THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION I5I 
(I984) (quoting Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice John M. Harlan (Sept. rr , I958) 
(emphasis added)). This letter was sent to Harlan shortly before the Court, in Cooper v. Aaron, 
358 U.S. I (I9S8), reaffirmed Brown and ordered desegregation of Central High in Little Rock, 
see id. at 17-20. The most famous statement in Cooper is similar to Frankfurter's language in 
his letter: "[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by 
this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional 
system." /d . at I8. 
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segregationists used the discredited doctrines of interposition and 
states' rights to make legalistic challenges to Brown, 261 they won the 
popular battle (for a while), but they were bound to lose the legal 
war. The crisis in Little Rock provides evidence of this. Arkansas 
Governor Orval Faubus's decision to forbid Negro students from en-
tering Little Rock Central High in 1957 made him a popular governor, 
but also led President Eisenhower to send the 101st Airborne Division 
to Little Rock to protect the students. Eisenhower explained on na-
tional television that "[m]ob rule cannot be allowed to override the 
decisions of our courts" and that "the foundation of the American 
way of life is our national respect for law. "262 Frankfurter ingeniously 
perceived that this struggle was not about the narrow subject of 
Brown; this struggle was really about the faith of Americans in the 
authority of the Supreme Court. That authority was more firmly 
grounded after the "true" explanation of Roberts's actions was pub-
lished. 
In early 1959, Paul Freund defended the Supreme Court from 
"irresponsible attacks. "263 He began by restating the lawfulness of 
Brown264 and concluded by defending the Court's First Amendment 
and Due Process decisions. But it is the title of Freund's address, 
The Supreme Court Crisis, 265 that sparks the most attention. 266 A 
generation earlier, Merlo Pusey had used the same title to discuss 
FDR's court-packing plan and Roberts's change of mind. Freund 
makes no mention of Supreme Court crises as a recurring theme, in 
part because the revised history of the earlier "crisis" demonstrated 
that in 1937 Roberts had acted as a principled judge. According to 
Freund, the crisis in the late 1950s was the result of an improper 
understanding by many public officials of the Court's role in the 
261 See FREYER, supra note 260, at 63-86. 
262 WILLIAMS, supra note 257 , at 107 (quoting Eisenhower's nationally televised speech). 
26J Freund, Supreme Court Crisis , supra note 251, at 70. One of those attacks was made 
by the Conference of State Chief Justices. See id. at 72-80 (defending the Court from a charge 
by the Conference). On August 23, 1958, at the height of the Little Rock crisis, the Conference 
voted 36-8 to condemn the Court for taking "the role of policy-maker without proper judicial 
restraint." See Eugene V. Rostow, The Court and Its Critics, 4 So. TEx. L.J. 160, 168-78 
(1959) (quoting the resolution and defending the Court). 
264 Freund wrote: 
A final obvious fact is that the decisions were not an abrupt departure in constitutional 
law or a novel interpretation of the guarantee of equal protection of the law. The old 
doctrine of separate-but-equal, announced in 1898, had been steadily eroded for at least 
a generation before the school cases, in the way that precedents are whittled down until 
they finally collapse. 
Freund, Supreme Court Crisis, supra note 251 , at 68 . 
265 Freund, Supreme Court Crisis, supra note 251. 
266 In asserting the importance of incremental change, of slowly whittling away "bad" prec-
edent, of acting as a "moderating" influence in society, of approaching the task of deciding as 
a "craftsman," and of relying on the singular importance of process, it is also an excellent 
example of post-World War II legal thought. 
1994] A THRICE-TOLD TALE 
democratic framework, not the Court's decisions. There is not the 
slightest suggestion that it was "deja vu all over again," because, for 
him, it wasn't. Freund's defense was to show that the Court simply 
was undertaking its traditional duty as the authoritative organ of what 
the Constitution required. 
By the time Professor Herbert Wechsler attacked as unprincipled 
the Court's reasoning in Brown in his 1959 Holmes lecture, 267 the 
revisionist history of the constitutional crisis of 1937 was already in 
place. 268 The new story of Roberts's actions gave legal scholars an-
other reason to trust the Court with the power of judicial review. 
Entrusting the Court with the judicial veto, as Frankfurter well knew, 
would transcend the Court's opinion in Brown, despite Wechsler's 
criticisms. 269 It was enough to "persuade the persuadable"270 of the 
Court's integrity and virtue, and enough to prevent critics in the 1950s 
from using the constitutional crisis of 1937 as precedent. 271 
267 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L . 
REv. I (1959). Wechsler's Holmes lecture was given on April 7, 1959. 
268 Wechsler was barred from claiming the constitutional crisis of 1937 as precedent because 
he apparently accepted the Frankfurter revised history. In 1960, Wechsler gave the Owen ]. 
Roberts Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania, in which he cited Frankfurter's tribute and 
concluded that Roberts 's switch had been "falsely publicized." Wechsler, supra note 165 , at 465 
(footnote omitted). Cf. Silber & Miller, supra note 14, at 872-73 (stating that during one of a 
series of interviews by the authors of Professor Wechsler between 1978-82 , the following question 
and answer is reported: "Do you feel that the court-packing plan proposed by President Roosevelt 
in 1937 and the change in direction that the Supreme Court took following that event amounted 
to a constitutional revolution against the closed system on the Court? Yes, I certainly do. I 
think Jones & Laughlin was a revolution , a constitutional revolution.· And, don't forget , the 
Social Security Act was also sustained." (footnotes omitted)). It is unclear from the manner in 
which the question was put whether Wechsler's belief that there was a "constitutional revolution" 
was a result of the court-packing plan. The reader should note that Wechsler's answer makes 
no mention of West Coast Hotel. 
269 In this view, the "crisis" generated by Wechsler's article was part of an internal debate 
among the heirs to the legal progressives about the Court's role in the democratic scheme. 
Following Wechsler's criticism, the search for the "lawful" nature of Brown became the search 
for the foundations of constitutional law. The justification of Brown has since shifted from its 
"lawfulness" to its "justness." See Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 
79 VA. L . REv. 583 , 583-84 & nn.4-7 , 619-20 (1993) . The influence of the realists on Post-
World War II legal thought in cordoning off "moral" arguments is discussed in Ariens, supra 
note 244, at 247-52 . See also HORWITZ, supra note 249, at 258 (arguing that Brown shattered 
the postwar ideal that the law was value-free); cf. Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the 
Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. roOI, 1014 (1965) (arguing that the doctrine of neutral 
principles does not "exclude value judgments from interpretation, as some others have alleged."). 
See generally EDWARD A. PuRCELL, }R., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC 
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 74-94 (1973) (describing the linkage between moral 
relativism and legal realism). 
n o McCLOSKEY, supra note 223 , at 216. 
27 1 In his 1959 Holmes lecture, Wechsler never sought to bolster his claim by citing to the 
crisis of 1937 . See Wechsler, supra note 267, at 31-35 . In his Holmes lectures of the previous 
year, Judge Learned Hand, who argued against the power of judicial review and concluded 
that Brown was a "legislative" and not a "judicial" decision, never mentioned FOR's court 
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For those looking to eliminate the Court's role as the "authoritative 
organ of what the Constitution requires,"272 Justice Frankfurter's re-
vision of Justice Roberts's shift from "political" to "principled" left few 
avenues down which opponents of the Court could travel to attack 
the Court's authority. 273 As Frankfurter suggested, obedience to the 
dictates of Brown would result from acceptance of the Court's au-
thority to interpret the Constitution, not from a particularized assess-
ment of the correctness of Brown. In voting to hold "separate but 
equal" public education unconstitutional in Brown, Justice Frankfurter 
properly performed his role as priest in the temple; in revising the 
history of the crisis of I 93 7, Justice Frankfurter properly performed 
his longer-running role as guardian of the Court's virtue. 
C. 
The initial version of Roberts's switch could be associated readily 
with a base law=politics version of legal realism, although the revi-
sionist history comported better with process jurisprudence, because 
it explained that the difference in Roberts's votes in More head and 
West Coast Hotel was based on principle rather than politics. 274 The 
fortuity of Roberts's death on the first anniversary of Brown allowed 
reorganization plan, the West Coast H otel or Jones & Laughlin Steel decisions, or the consti-
tutional crisis of 193 7. See HAND, supra note r r8. 
272 FREYER, supra note 260, at rsr (quoting Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice 
John M. Harlan (Sept. II, 1958)). 
273 In addition to their long friendship, this might explain why Frankfurter so heartily 
congratulated Hand on the success of his Holmes Lectures, which were many years in the 
making. Frankfurter noted Hand's view that Brown was a "legislative" rather than "judicial" 
opinion, and then told Hand that, had he been faced with Brown, Frankfurter was confident 
that Hand would have voted to declare segregated schools unconstitutional. See Letter from 
Felix Frankfurter to Judge Learned Hand (retired) (Feb. 13 , 1958), microformed on Library of 
Congress Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Container 65. 
274 But see FRED RODELL, NINE MEN 221 (1955) ("Roberts is the perfect personification of 
the chanciness of government by judges."). In Rodell's version, the Supreme Court was able to 
avoid the imposition of the court-packing plan because the average American citizen was in 
awe of the Court, and because of Hughes's sagacious leadership. See id. at 247. Rodell was 
aware of the timing of the conference vote in West Coast Hotel, but remained convinced that 
Roberts had switched his vote. As a Yale law professor long associated with legal realism, 
Rodell also delighted in noting the political nature of judging and the judiciary. "[T]he consti-
tutional theories of all politicians, including Supreme Court Justices , are no more than high-
faluting ways of arguing for the political ends they are really after," id. at 2 r 7, and "the Court 
was a rather random collection of nine men exercising a political function atop one of the three 
branches of the federal government," id. at 24 7. Rodell also suggested that FDR's reelection 
might have been the impetus for Roberts's change, although that "must remain a matter of 
informed conjecture - at least until intimate memoirs are possibly published at a decent interval 
after the death of Roberts, the last survivor of the Nine Old Men." /d . at 243. On Rodell 's 
antipathy toward Frankfurter and Harvard Law School, see KALMAN, supra note 209, at 145-
47, 201, 294 n.8o. 
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Frankfurter and those more sympathetic to a legal rationale to use 
this revised history to bolster acceptance of the Court's authority to 
decide the constitutionality of state and federal laws, including, most 
contentiously, state laws mandating segregation. In this way, the 
institution, and thus the independence of the Court, might be pro-
tected from charges of "lawlessness," or more currently, "politics." 
If the integrity of our democratic framework required a commit-
ment to civil rights for Negroes, and if the judiciary was the only 
branch of the federal government able to create a constitutional frame-
work to implement civil rights, then it was crucial that the Court 
maintain its integrity. The revised history was one effort to provide 
a foundation for that integrity. At the time Frankfurter wrote his 
tribute (and continuing through today), judicial independence from 
politics was a necessary prerequisite to judicial integrity. Professor 
Sunstein is right: Brown is the Court's leading symbol of judicial 
independence. 27 5 Part of the reason Brown is so viewed is that a 
plausible story of the Court's fidelity to law, including the events of 
I 93 7, made it easier to sell Brown as a permissible interpretation of 
the Constitution in the face of massive resistance. Justice Felix Frank-
furter helped to create and disseminate that plausible story. 
VII. 
Justice Frankfurter began his tribute to Justice Roberts with this 
statement: "The dictum that history cannot be written without doc-
uments is less than a half-truth if it implies that it can be written 
from them. "276 Justice Frankfurter's wise advice is a caution to any-
one trying to write about "what really happened," or anyone trying 
to write about what someone else claims really happened. But Justice 
Frankfurter failed to heed his own advice; relying heavily on a "doc-
ument" to explain Justice Roberts's "switch" cannot rewrite the history 
of the crisis of I 93 7. 
275 See Sunstein, supra note 239 , at 47. 
276 Frankfurter, supra note IO, at 3II. In a I96o conversation with Gerald Gunther, Justice 
Frankfurter recalled that this view grew out of a conversation he had had with Charles Beard. 
S ee Transcribed Interview of Felix Frankfurter by Gerald Gunther, Sept. IS, I96o, at I6, 
microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, supra note 78, at Part III, Reel 28 ("Charlie once 
said to me, 'You can't write documents- you can't write history without documents- without 
documents.' And I said, 'Charlie, if you'll only add to that, you can't write history merely out 
of documents.'" (Justice Frankfurter speaking)); see also Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter 
to Professor Thomas Reed Powell (June I9, I944), microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, 
supra note 78 , at Part III , Reel I8 ("(I) while documents are indispensable to the writing of 
history, disclosed documents alone are obviously insufficient; (2) even if one has all the docu-
ments , public and private, in themselves they are not the full or final voices of truth."). 
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Commenting on Judge Learned Hand's memorial tribute to Chief 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, Paul Freund wrote, "Memorial addresses 
often provide an even truer insight into the speaker than into the 
subject .... "277 Never was this more true than when Justice Frank-
furter gave tribute to Justice Roberts. 
277 PAUL A. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 34 (1961) . 
